RFC - "Proposal for Establishing a Council for Decentraland DAO" Draft Proposal

Hello, community,

We would like to share the drafts of each proposal following the discussions we had at the DCL DAO: Regenesis Summit in Lisbon. These drafts are being released at the same time as the poll to kickstart the governance process, which is now open for voting.

Our goal is to gather feedback and ensure that everyone has a clear understanding of the plan as it develops. We encourage you to share your thoughts during the voting period of the poll, as your input is crucial in shaping the future of the DAO.

Title

Proposal for Establishing a Council for Decentraland DAO

Summary

Establish a Council for Decentraland DAO to oversee the Executive Arm, approve annual strategies and budgets, and ensure alignment with the DAO’s mission. Council members will be elected by VP holders and hold the Executive Arm accountable.

Abstract

The current governance model of the Decentraland DAO requires VP holders to vote on every proposal, leading to slow processes, lack of accountability, and misalignment with strategic goals. To reduce voter fatigue, DAO members should vote less on more important stuff. To professionalize operations, the DAO needs to delegate operational oversight to an Executive Arm. However, for this to function effectively, and be held accountable for its actions, the DAO must first establish a Council of Representatives responsible for hiring, guiding, and, if necessary, replacing the Director of the Executive Arm.

The Council will also oversee the approval of the Executive Arm’s annual strategy and budget, ensuring alignment with the DAO’s mission. Council members will be elected and dismissed through VP voting, ensuring community control while enabling more efficient and professional governance.

Motivation

Currently, the Decentraland DAO expects all VP holders to vote on every proposal, which presents several issues:

  • Inefficiency: The process is slow and cumbersome, delaying critical decisions.
  • Lack of Expertise: Many voters lack the necessary context or skills to make informed decisions, leading to suboptimal outcomes.
  • Time-Consuming: Requiring the full attention of voters on non-critical matters is inefficient and unsustainable.
  • Voter Fatigue: This system contributes to voter fatigue, discouraging active participation.
  • No Strategic Accountability: There is no clear mechanism to ensure alignment with long-term strategic goals.
  • Diffuse Responsibility: With everyone voting on everything, accountability is diluted, making it difficult to hold anyone responsible for poor performance or missed opportunities.

Specification

Council Composition:

  • The Council will consist of 5 doxxed members who are subject matter experts in areas such as strategic management, finance, creativity, and technology.
  • Members should have a deep understanding of Decentraland’s technology, audience, and stakeholders.
  • Provide representation across different sectors, including the Foundation, MANA/LAND holders, the developer and creators communities, and Decentraland citizens.

Election and Dismissal Process:

  • Council members will be elected through an open call and VP voting. Currently, a hiring proposal requires a minimum of 6 million VP and a one-month voting period.
  • Members can be fired via VP voting through a firing proposal, also requiring 6 million VP and a one-month voting period.
  • In the event of a Council member’s resignation, the Council must initiate a new open call to fill the position within the following month.

Compensation:

  • Council members will be compensated 1,000 USD per month payable in MANA for their responsibilities and commitment.

Responsibilities of the Council:

  • Hire the Executive Director: The Council will be responsible for hiring, guiding, and, if necessary, replacing the Director of the Executive Arm.
  • Approval of Strategy and Budget: The Council will review, approve, and publish the Annual Strategy Plan and Budget proposed by the Executive Director.
  • Treasury Management: The Council will approve and publish the Treasury Management Strategy to ensure long-term financial sustainability.
  • Formal Oversight: The Council will hold formal meetings every three months with the Executive Director to review progress, and members must be available for individual meetings with the Director as needed.
  • Publishing Reports: The Council will publish regular reports on the status of operations and the treasury, outlining the contributions and decisions made by each member.

Veto Power:

  • Once the Council approves and publishes the Annual Strategy and Treasury Management Strategy, a veto governance proposal will be initiated, giving VP holders the chance to block any decision that is misaligned with the DAO’s mission or goals. If no quorum is reached, the Council’s decisions will move forward as planned.

Conclusion

Establishing a Council for the Decentraland DAO is a critical step toward professionalizing the DAO’s governance and improving operational efficiency. By delegating the responsibility of hiring and overseeing the Executive Arm, approving strategic plans, and managing the treasury, the Council will ensure that Decentraland’s operations are aligned with its long-term mission and vision. This proposal seeks to address the inefficiencies of the current system, reduce voter fatigue, and bring accountability to the DAO’s operations while maintaining community control through VP voting mechanisms.

Further Reading

2 Likes

Always appreciate the hard work organizing these thoughts @ginoct !

I still think it’s too premature to create these positions since there is no product to “manage” in the next 6 years.

However, I do like Councils - but in the sense of assessment and evaluation, not implementation (yet). If we have councils right now, they should be on an informational review and presentation basis and not on any decision making.

4 Likes

I don’t think we need 5 people for this…

  • Hire the Executive Director:

  • Approval of Strategy and Budget:
    Make up some numbers… The approve them…

  • Treasury Management:
    Same as above…

  • Publishing Reports:

  • Create a database…

  • Formal Oversight:

  • 5 people overseeing the director? Seems a bit excessive. Why not just let the council be the director?

@lastraum Let’s continue the conversation here regarding the Exploration Council
I really like the idea of having a group of informed individuals assess what it takes to run Decentraland and envision the project’s mid-term future. Instead of forming a separate council, what if the proposed Council here becomes the team responsible for this assessment? As you mentioned, the Council wouldn’t handle implementation but would focus on evaluation and guidance. In this way, the Council could deliver a document that establishes the foundations for the DAO’s strategy. By including people with deep context and representatives from various sectors of the community, this Council would be well-equipped to craft such a strategy.

Because from my pov the responsibility of executing a strategy cannot be in the hands of 5 people. And if the council is the director, who makes the executive arm accountable for their work?

Let’s continue for sure!

I think a council in this format is necessary to make informed decisions. There are too many unknown data points right now, and a full blown organizational structure is premature.

This council or team or collective of subject matter experts would take a deep dive on understanding the operational side of Decentraland. From there, better decisions can be made about how the DAO is able to define it’s Mission & Vision. Nothing at the DAO has to change in the next 4-6 months. The DAO won’t “miss” an opportunity because it waited to create a centralized structure. The protocol squad can still work on their alternative clients. The Foundation can work on their client. The DAO can hold its funds. The community can still get together.

I still lean on this being a pro bono (non paid) endeavor. This effort is all subject to Foundation collaboration.

The proposed structure has way too much overlap. The proposed Council literally does nothing but approve / reject the executive decisions. The proposed Council does not create anything - what is their point? Why not remove them completely and let the approvals, rejections, vetos go directly to the dao community members?

  • Hire the Executive Director - only direct decision the proposed council makes
  • Approval of Strategy and Budget - the executive creates this - the council approves and publishes? why can’t the executive publish? lol it would be a blog post
  • Treasury Management: - executive creates the budget - the council approves and publishes? why can’t the executive publish? lol it would be a blog post
  • Publishing Reports - what contributions would a council member make? all they do is approve or reject the strategy and budget from the executive? - again, the council approves and publishes? why can’t the executive publish? lol it would be a blog post

This is the biggest takeaway of all and 100% highlights how far removed the community is from decision making. This literally says “the decisions are already approved and published by other people, hey community good luck trying to veto this”

Veto Power:

  • Once the Council approves and publishes the Annual Strategy and Treasury Management Strategy, a veto governance proposal will be initiated, giving VP holders the chance to block any decision that is misaligned with the DAO’s mission or goals. If no quorum is reached, the Council’s decisions will move forward as planned.
1 Like

When I think of approving a strategy:
I think of a board room with 10 people sitting around a table each explaining their strategy for the CEO to decide.
But I don’t think we’re at that kind of level yet. :sweat_smile:

With the tiers system the community deliver the strategic options, the Tier 1s create the strategy and the GOD executes the strategy:

So for example:
I might have a connection to a top influencer.
That will implement decentraland in a video for $2000.

That offer would be on the table for the tier1s to consider and decide whether to execute it or not.

Hi Lastraum,

Thank you for your thoughtful feedback!

I wanted to jump in and clarify a key point. We need a transparent system for publishing critical decisions, allowing the community to exercise veto power when necessary. Rather than using a Blogspot or other informal platform, these decisions could be published on the Governance page, similar to how governance proposals are handled, with a defined voting period.

The community delegates decision-making authority to the Council, but they retain the power to veto any decisions that seem misaligned with the DAO’s mission. This approach would not only enhance transparency but also improve execution efficiency by keeping timelines tight.

The veto shouldn’t just apply to the Annual Strategy and Treasury Management strategy—it should extend to other critical decisions as well. This is something we need to define more clearly moving forward.

Looking forward to your thoughts on this!