RFC - "Establishing an Executive Arm to improve DAO Operations" Draft Proposal

Hello, community,

We would like to share the drafts of each proposal following the discussions we had at the DCL DAO: Regenesis Summit in Lisbon. These drafts are being released at the same time as the poll to kickstart the governance process, which is now open for voting.

Our goal is to gather feedback and ensure that everyone has a clear understanding of the plan as it develops. We encourage you to share your thoughts during the voting period of the poll, as your input is crucial in shaping the future of the DAO.

Title

Establishing an Executive Arm to improve DAO Operations

Summary

This proposal aims to establish an Executive Arm for Decentraland DAO to manage operations and resource allocation under the oversight of a DAO Council. The DAO retains control over the governance process, the Treasury, and the project’s smart contracts.

Abstract

Decentraland DAO faces numerous challenges, including inefficient resource allocation, difficulties in talent retention, short-term focus, and misalignment with the Decentraland Foundation. This proposal recommends establishing an Executive Arm to promote long-term planning, streamline operations, provide essential services to the DAO, distribute funds for community projects, and execute key initiatives under the oversight of a DAO Council. The Executive Arm will ensure all operations are aligned with the DAO’s mission, fostering strategic growth and sustainability.

Motivation

The Decentraland DAO has encountered significant roadblocks in its current structure, impacting its effectiveness and long-term sustainability. Below are the key issues that need to be addressed:

  1. Resource Allocation Inefficiencies:
    Despite the introduction of new grant management systems like the Grants Support Squad and Revocations Committee, the DAO continues to struggle with resource allocation. These mechanisms have not effectively addressed the challenges of prioritizing impactful projects, leading to inefficiencies and, in some cases, misallocation of funds. Additionally, malicious actors and a lack of clear context around the potential impact of projects often result in suboptimal funding decisions. There is a need for a more strategic, context-driven approach to fund allocation, ensuring that resources are directed toward initiatives that will have a meaningful and lasting impact.
  2. Misalignment with the Decentraland Foundation:
    The Decentraland DAO and the Decentraland Foundation remain misaligned in terms of strategic objectives, despite the establishment of improved communication channels like the Request for Information (RFI) process, Canny feedback, and Community All Hands meetings. This misalignment largely stems from the difference in organizational structures: the Foundation operates as a traditional, top-down organization, while the DAO follows a decentralized, bottom-up approach. These differing architectures make collaboration challenging, leading to inefficiencies in decision-making and project execution. Achieving better alignment between the two entities is critical for the success of Decentraland as a whole.
  3. Short-Term Focus:
    The current funding model of the DAO tends to incentivize short-term, output-focused projects, rather than fostering long-term, impactful initiatives. Many projects aim for quick wins to secure funding but often lack a sustainable vision that supports the DAO’s long-term goals. To build a robust, open alternative to big tech metaverses, Decentraland must shift its focus from short-term outputs to long-term, strategic objectives. This requires a comprehensive planning framework that prioritizes enduring value and growth for the ecosystem.
  4. Talent Acquisition, Retention, and Continuity:
    One of the most pressing issues the DAO faces is the difficulty in hiring and retaining top talent, particularly under the grant-funded Core Unit model. The reliance on short-term grants has made long-term planning and continuity difficult, resulting in critical disruptions when teams are dissolved or personnel leave. For example, the recent dissolution of the Facilitation Squad left key initiatives incomplete, highlighting the fragility of the current system. To ensure Decentraland’s long-term success, a more stable and sustainable approach to talent acquisition, retention, and role continuity is needed.
  5. Treasury Management Issues:
    The DAO has made several unsuccessful attempts to manage its treasury effectively, which has weakened its reputation with partners, vendors, and potential contributors. These failures highlight the need for a better strategy in terms of both treasury diversification and long-term financial management. The DAO must adopt a more comprehensive approach to managing its assets, ensuring that its treasury can support the project’s long-term sustainability. Without addressing these issues, the DAO risks continued financial instability, which could undermine its ability to fund important initiatives and achieve its mission.

Specification

Responsibilities of the Executive Arm:

  • Annual planning and budgeting:
    The Executive Arm will develop a long-term strategy aligned with Decentraland’s vision of creating an open, user-owned metaverse, and the mission to ensure the sustainability of the Decentraland ecosystem through representative governance, management of collective resources, and technical innovation. This strategy will be focused on sustainable growth and community engagement.
  • Grant Management:
    The Executive Arm will oversee all community grants, ensuring that funds are strategically allocated to projects that align with long-term goals, reducing risks of misallocation to short-term or low-impact initiatives.
  • Strategic Initiatives Management:
    The Executive Arm will be responsible for hiring and managing staff to execute key strategic initiatives, such as seasonal events, improvements in creator tools, and alternative clients, and enhancing communication infrastructure to support the community.
  • Operational Oversight:
    The Executive Arm will ensure full transparency by regularly reporting on its activities to the DAO. This includes financial disclosures, maintaining legal compliance, managing staff salaries, and fostering collaboration with the Decentraland Foundation to ensure alignment across all operations.

Oversight by the DAO Council:

  • Hire the Director of the Executive Arm:
    The DAO Council will be responsible for hiring, guiding, and, if necessary, replacing the Director of the Executive Arm. The Director’s performance will be regularly reviewed to ensure alignment with the DAO’s mission and strategic goals.
  • Strategy and Budget Approval:
    The Director of the Executive Arm will propose an annual strategy and budget, outlining key initiatives, project plans, and financial allocations for the year. The DAO Council must approve this proposal before implementation, and the decision will be subject to veto by the DAO.
  • Treasury Diversification Strategy:
    The Executive Arm will develop a strategy for diversifying the DAO’s treasury to generate sustainable growth. This diversification plan will be submitted to the DAO Council for approval, and the decision will be subject to veto by the DAO.

Governance Powers Retained by the DAO:

  • Governance Mechanisms:
    The Executive Arm will not have the authority to modify the DAO’s governance mechanisms. The DAO’s current three-stage governance process—polls, drafts, and binding proposals—remains intact, ensuring decentralized decision-making.
  • Ownership of the Treasury and Decentraland’s Smart Contracts:
    The Security Advisory Board (SAB) will continue safeguarding smart contracts and maintaining custody of the DAO’s treasury, ensuring additional security and oversight independent from the Executive Arm.
  • Election and Oversight of the DAO Council:
    The DAO retains the power to elect and dismiss members of the DAO Council through hiring proposals. Additionally, the DAO will have the ability to veto any strategy or budget approved by the DAO Council.
  • Veto proposal: The DAO will have the power to veto critical proposals proposed by the Council.

The organizational structure, departmental framework, budget, and resource allocation strategy will be developed autonomously by the Director of the Executive Arm and presented to the DAO Council for approval. While this proposal establishes clear boundaries and divisions of responsibilities to ensure accountability, it intentionally provides the Executive Arm with the necessary flexibility and ownership to define how it operates. This allows the Executive Arm to adapt and refine its internal processes over time, ensuring it can respond effectively to the evolving needs of the Decentraland DAO. The DAO will also retain the power to veto critical decisions from the Council

Conclusion

The establishment of an Executive Arm, supported by a DAO Council, is critical to overcoming the inefficiencies and challenges faced by the Decentraland DAO. This structure will enable more strategic, long-term planning, better talent retention, and improved resource allocation. The DAO retains control over critical governance functions, ensuring that power remains decentralized. By addressing key operational challenges, this proposal positions Decentraland for sustainable growth and leadership in the open metaverse space.

Further reading:

1 Like

I appreciate all the hard work you’re putting into this! I do appreciate this.

I would like to keep the same “conversational tone” from our twitter spaces last week in this discussion.

Also, I would like to make this point early on in case people stop reading. And @ginoct if I am wrong in my assertions, please correct me!

The proposed structure creates 1) an executive branch 2) an elected council to “govern” the executive branch. The DAO (community) becomes TWICE removed from decision making.

(Edit)
The Executive Arm (decision making) → The DAO Council → The DAO (community) - this is how far removed the community will be from decision making.

Motivation
1 - I completely agree, and change is required.
2 - You say the Foundation is top down; DAO is bottom up; and this leads to challenges.

Is better alignment making both entities top down, or bottom up? the proposed structure is not bottom up. (i will address the reality of “bottom up” later)
3 - Is the DAO supposed to “live” beyond its initial 10 year vesting period? Is that part of the Mission & Vision? What if the DAO mandate was: here’s a 10 year runway and some money, go build the best product you can - The DAO continues to try and extends its resources and longevity without actually addressing if that’s even its purpose.
4 - We cannot know what talent to “hire” because we don’t know what the product will be. Will we need system admins? unity engineers? 3d modelers? Brand Partnerships? SDK engineers? There’s currently no visibility and collaboration between The Foundation ↔ DAO on personnel and requirements; therefore, how can we plan to hire for jobs that we don’t know exist?
5 - Complete agree - however, did anyone notice the DAO Committee swap unused grant funds into eth? Was this part of any proposal? Is that part of their role & responsibility? I genuinely do not know of a proposal giving them the authority so please link if I missed it.

Specification

  • Annual planning and budgeting - for what? I’m being blunt because what is there to plan for or budget for? The Foundation “hand off” to The DAO is in 6 years; I understand preparedness and planning, but this is premature.

  • Grant Management: I agree here to some degree; needs to be restructured regardless - I proposed a 20/80 or 90/10 split where “community grants” get the lesser of the split. These funds are unfocused and promote individual creators and initiatives. The remaining larger split go towards targeted, focused initiatives agreed upon by the DAO community with a more traditional RFP and defined budget process.

  • Strategic Initiatives Management:
    – does this assume the Foundation will no longer be responsible (in the next 6 years) for major “tent pole” events - Fashion Week, Pride Month, Art Week, Game Jam, Music Festival, Halloween?
    – Regarding creator tools and alternative clients, those are already being built by the DAO and sit “on top” of the SDK - what other types of clients will we need besides the ones being currently worked on?
    – It shouldn’t take a paid position to have better communication between the Foundation ↔ DAO - it’s 2024 and there’s plenty of technology to improve that infrastructure without paid human oversight

  • Operational Oversight: Why can’t this be autonomous and done on chain? What better transparency will be provided than what we already have?

In Conclusion for those still reading:

  • we don’t need this organizational structure yet because there’s nothing to manage yet.
  • The DAO community is being tremendously removed from direct decision making - you elect a group of people who have your best interest, and those people act in good faith to hire an executive team and keep them “in check.”
5 Likes

Shotgun director position.
:muscle:

DAO has significant capital :moneybag: to convert in content :joystick: for Decentraland. It is in fact being converted to content since the beginning of grant proposals. DCL has countless new content thanks to grantees. This change is about the efficiency of the system. I guess everyone would agree that the total sum of what is being provided by the grantees is way too expensive for the content that is being delivered.

This is really the point. Accept it or not, DAO community is one of the (maybe the biggest) reason of bad content in DCL.

Check most tier 1 grants and you will see most of them doesn’t even have a (proper/modern) website. Why did “DAO community” pay a quarter million dollars each to a couple of non-existent studios? Because the decision makers are insufficient when it comes to weight the skills of a grant proposer.

Thank you so much for your thoughtful feedback and for taking the time to engage in this discussion. I really appreciate the effort you’re putting into considering the bigger picture and raising important points.

Regarding your concerns, I’d be glad to respond in line with the agreements made during the Lisbon summit.

In response to your point:
“The proposed structure creates 1) an executive branch 2) an elected council to govern the executive branch. The DAO (community) becomes TWICE removed from decision making. The Executive Arm (decision making) → The DAO Council → The DAO (community) - this is how far removed the community will be from decision making.”

We collectively agreed on a structure where:

  1. The community would elect —through the existing hiring process— for the council members (Draft proposal).
  2. The elected council members would be responsible for guiding the Executive Arm, ensuring alignment with the DAO’s mission (I’d love to move away from the term “govern” here and focus more on their role as strategic guides).

What does this mean in practice?

The Executive Arm, led by the Executive Director, will present the annual planning and budgeting to manage the grants, handle strategic initiatives and oversee daily operations. The Executive Arm’s primary focus is to ensure that these functions are fully aligned with the DAO’s mission while remaining accountable to the community. If the Executive Director fails to meet these expectations, they can be replaced.

Addressing “The DAO becoming Twice removed from decision-making”

I believe it’s the opposite. The community’s decision-making power remains intact, because:

First, the community elects the council members. Once in place, these elected members work with the Executive Arm. However, the community retains veto power over critical decisions made by the council. For example, if the Executive Director presents the annual plan and budget to the council for approval, the community has the ability to veto this decision if it doesn’t align with their expectations. This mechanism ensures the community remains at the core of decision-making.

Regarding your questions from 1 to 4

The Executive Director is tasked with addressing these questions by developing a clear strategy, which will then need to be approved by the council. As mentioned, the community can veto decisions if necessary. These are valid concerns, and it is the Executive Director’s responsibility to transparently request feedback from the community when developing these strategies.

Regarding questions 5:
The DAO Committee is an executive entity that works according to the result of the governance proposal. and In the case that you mentioned, they are doing what the community voted here: Decentraland DAO Treasury Diversification ( Phase A )
Correct me if I´m wrong (@rizk ), please.

Also, the mission of the DAO is being decided in this current process.

Operational Oversight

I fully agree with your point that operational oversight should be 100% transparent and ideally on-chain. However, this transition might take time, and we should explore methods to make it happen gradually. In the meantime, we can implement a clear and accessible front page or dashboard to allow the community to track operations day-to-day, ensuring transparency from the start.

Once again, thank you for your valuable feedback and for engaging in this important conversation. I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we can refine these ideas together!

2 Likes

>>CLICK THE LINK<<
Why not do it opensource and decentralized straight away?

Thanks for the reply Gino! Good conversations.

If I vote someone else (council) to elect and approve an executive, that’s removing my ability for direct decision making.

Any representation is removing the direct influence of a persons vote.

I know America is a representative democracy and my votes and beliefs are many times removed from the actual decision making. I accept that for what it is. If the dao is becoming a representative organization, call it that. We need to be very clear what is happening.

Having veto power is not having direct decision making. The dao is not setting the agenda: a representative is. Therefore, the dao is not DIRECTLY involved in that agenda decision making; the DAO only has reactionary power.

If the vp and voting system isn’t fixed, then whales can override a veto if they side with the council and executive (nepotism and favoritism). So, this new structure is not immune to lobbying and back door deals.

Again, providing examples to help illustrate.

Executive arm is favorable to foundation. They put forth an agenda and budget. Council approves, dao vetos. Whales counter veto because “it’s in the interest of the dao to approve the executive decision”

There’s too much overlap in organizational structure for this to be transparent and efficient. I will mention this more in the RFC Council forum post.

2 Likes