[DAO:5a9f32f] Proposal for Establishing a Council for Decentraland DAO

Governance
1

by 0x511a22cdd2c4ee8357bb02df2578037ffe8a4d8d (ginoct)

Linked Pre-Proposal

Should we restructure the way our DAO operates?

Summary

Establish a Council for the DAO to oversee the Executive Arm, approve annual strategies and budgets, and ensure alignment with the DAO’s mission. VP holders (The community) will elect council members and hold the Executive Arm accountable via them.

Abstract

The current governance model of the Decentraland DAO requires VP holders to vote on every proposal, leading to slow processes, lack of accountability, and misalignment with strategic goals. DAO members should vote less on more important stuff to reduce voter fatigue. To professionalize operations, the DAO needs to delegate operational oversight to an Executive Arm. However, for this to function effectively, and be held accountable for its actions, the DAO must first establish a Council of Representatives responsible for hiring, guiding, and, if necessary, replacing the Director of the Executive Arm.

The Council will also oversee the approval of the Executive Arm’s annual strategy and budget, ensuring alignment with the DAO’s mission. Council members will be elected and dismissed through VP voting, ensuring community control while enabling more efficient and professional governance.

Motivation

Currently, the Decentraland DAO expects all VP holders to vote on every proposal, which presents several issues:

  • Inefficiency: The process is slow and cumbersome, delaying critical decisions.
  • Lack of Expertise: Many voters lack the necessary context or skills to make informed decisions, leading to suboptimal outcomes.
  • Time-Consuming: Requiring the full attention of voters on non-critical matters is inefficient and unsustainable. Creates voter fatigue and discourages active participation.
  • No Strategic Direction: There is no clear mechanism to ensure alignment with long-term strategic goals.
  • Diffuse Responsibility: With everyone voting on everything, accountability is diluted, making it difficult to hold anyone responsible for poor performance or missed opportunities.

Specification

Council Composition:

  • The Council will consist of 5 doxxed members who are subject matter experts in areas such as strategic management, finance, creativity, and technology.
  • Members should have a deep understanding of Decentraland’s technology, audience, and stakeholders.
  • Provide representation across different sectors, including the Foundation, MANA/LAND holders, the developer and creators communities, and Decentraland citizens.

Election and Dismissal Process:

  • Council members will be elected through an open call and VP voting. Currently, a hiring proposal requires a minimum of 6 million VP and a one-month voting period.
  • Members can be fired via VP voting through a firing proposal, also requiring 6 million VP and a one-month voting period. Additional options such as ongoing VP backing for Council members could be explored in the Governance proposal.
  • In the event of a Council member’s resignation, the Council must initiate a new open call to fill the position within the following month.

Compensation:

  • Council members will be compensated 1,000 USD per month payable in MANA for their responsibilities and commitment.

Responsibilities of the Council:

  • Hire the Executive Director: The Council will be responsible for hiring, guiding, and, if necessary, replacing the Director of the Executive Arm.
  • Approval of Strategy and Budget: The Council will review, approve, and publish the Annual Strategy Plan and Budget proposed by the Executive Director.
  • Treasury Management: The Council will approve and publish the Treasury Management Strategy to ensure long-term financial sustainability.
  • Formal Oversight: The Council will hold formal meetings every three months with the Executive Director to review progress, and members must be available for individual meetings with the Director as needed.
  • Publishing Reports: The Council will publish regular reports on the status of operations and the treasury, outlining the contributions and decisions made by each member.

Veto Power:

Once the Council approves and publishes the Annual Strategy and Treasury Management Strategy, a veto governance proposal can be initiated within a two-week period of the decision publication date, giving VP holders the chance to block any decision that is misaligned with the DAO’s mission or goals.

Conclusion

Establishing a Council for the Decentraland DAO is a critical step toward professionalizing the DAO’s governance and improving operational efficiency. By delegating the responsibility of hiring and overseeing the Executive Arm, approving strategic plans, and managing the treasury, the Council will ensure that Decentraland’s operations are aligned with its long-term mission and vision. This proposal seeks to address the inefficiencies of the current system, reduce voter fatigue, and bring accountability to the DAO’s operations while maintaining community control through VP voting mechanisms.

Vote on this proposal on the Decentraland DAO

View this proposal on Snapshot

1 Like
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This whole system is confusing…
It seems to be centralized but you avoid to mention that.
You have posted a lot of content but not really responded to any of the comments on the forum?

Why don’t the foundation talk directly to the executive arm and they can decide their own director?
(Like the tier system)

This seems like the same things that were proposed when the GSS and governance squad that was started by yemel.
Which essentially failed :man_shrugging:

Can you describe some benefits of your system compared to the tier system?

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People are visibly not interested by your tier system, why do you keep spamming on every single other proposals about it?

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Nobody with current DCL positions has commented on the tier system so I’m making sure that they all had a chance to see it. Nor has anyone responded to any of my comments about the new system…
This whole system is passing because it is a forced choice. There is no alternative. There is no discussion.
And once it’s implemented there’s no incentive for the people that get the positions to dethrone themselves.

Build decentralized and build properly.

5

Remodeling how grants work was enough to be honest. Last couple proposals are trying to fix non-existent problems. Hire a senior game developer who will approve grant proposals after auditing, who will report to DAO (which can vote to warn and eventually fire them) and call it a day. Having a person who is responsible for higher tier grants is all we need. Other DAO tasks like approving wearables, POI’s, Linked Wearables, managing LAND and ESTATE, smart contracts, catalysts and many more I didn’t mention are already done well.

6

@ginoct @Zino does “doxxed members” mean the entire community needs to know their full name , address, etc or just between the council members and executives?

1 Like
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Hi @BET , I’d like to share my thoughts on the Tier system.

I think it’s a good framework for handling small community projects. I’d actually like to see a funding stream where the community can request funds for projects that may not be 100% aligned with the goals set by the Council/Executive Arm but are still relevant and could add value to the project. We could consider this as a high-risk investment that the DAO undertakes. This is where the Tier 3 structure could be valuable.

The problem arises with the higher tiers. No one working full-time professionally to organize community events would accept being paid $200 in MANA—that’s less than an Uber driver makes in a day. If we only allow people to earn such a low amount for a 20k grant, they’ll end up doing this just to make a living. I’d rather see a small but skilled team of event producers (preferably with experience in gaming or tech) working full-time on planning, securing partnerships, creating briefs and Gantt charts, and then finding professional development teams or artists to execute tasks. These teams could come from within the community or be outsourced.

The same issue applies to Tier 1. A highly skilled developer working on protocol-level tasks for a crypto project, earning less than $2k a month? That’s less than what a junior QA makes. Entrusting multisig control over thousands or millions of dollars to individuals earning so little isn’t a good idea either.

In conclusion, while I like the concept of using Tiers for accessing projects, funding, and potentially even some types of decisions (like Optimism’s Citizens House), I don’t believe this is the right structure.

Having a group of people with high context and knowledge of the project, being in touch with Foundation and other actors of the ecosystem, helping craft a strategy, and then a team of people responsible for executing that strategy by performing some tasks on their own but mainly allocating resources to other service providers for doing the projects required seems a leaner approach for me.

1 Like
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I don’t think anyone wants to have their addresses published on the internet, doxxed for me is name and faces for the entire community and maybe other personal information between them.

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Appreciate the reply.

Yes, the base rates are low for the tier system… (It can be increased)…
But the idea was that money can be given for extra work (Like events, shipping projects, etc) which is issued by the tier 1s depending on what work has been done.
This allows the people that are working harder be able to earn more. While those working less can still earn a base rate. Someone that is not doing any work (maybe on holiday) and still earning $2k a month is a reasonable income. If someone is consistently not working then they can be removed with 1 vote per person or Percentage-based VP.

Tier 1s have direct contract with the foundation as well plus they have a greater technical knowledge about the project. Imagine the foundation want something and they tell the council. Then the council tell the executive arm and the devs say that it’s not possible. It would be a waste of time. Why would the foundation not just contact directly?
But mainly, why centralize if there’s a decentralized option?

10

Thanks for the reply! I don’t see how the Tier system is fundamentally different from this proposal. In the Tier system, lower tiers are voted by the community. In this proposal, council members are voted by the community. In the Tier system, higher tiers are chosen by the members of the tiers above, in this proposal, only the executive arm director is chosen by council votes. What would be the key difference here?

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I think there needs to be some clear definitions as to the what these catergories cover:
strategic management, finance, creativity, and technology.

What is the official MISSION STATEMENT for the Decentraland? For the DAO?

What are the TERM limits of council members and Executive? 6months, 1 year? 2 years?

Disturbing side note: 1 person can enact this regardless of how the current voters vote! Even if everyone currently having voted, voted NO it will still pass with that 1 vote. So it is in essence, 1 person’s decision that will decide any further outcomes in this matter. I can only hope that whatever the final outcome of all this restructuring is, is that it is all done IN THE BEST INTEREST OF AND FOR THE BETTERMENT OF DECENTRALAND!

1 Like
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Yes, they are very similar…

The key differences are:

  1. Greater accountability for individuals. (Less focus on teams.)
  2. Easier to understand ranking system. (Tier 1 > tier 2. vs Council > Executive arm.).
  3. More community involvement with lower tier members.
  4. Less VP involvement for non-important votes. (1 vote per tier members).
  5. Percentage based VP. (A fairer VP system which makes it more difficult for MANA whales to drain the DAO.)
  6. Can be done fully decentralized.
  7. If the DAO is a success then the foundation can gradually hand over more power to the tier 1s multi-sig.
  8. Less focus on budgeting, marketing, overseeing and more focus on developing.
  9. More transparency.
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Proposal for Establishing a Council for Decentraland DAO

This proposal is now in status: PASSED.

Voting Results:

  • Yes 93% 11,503,768 VP (25 votes)
  • No 6% 822,956 VP (15 votes)
  • Abstain 1% 3,981 VP (4 votes)
1 Like
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how do y’all prevent things like the recent radiant hack?

1 Like
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limiting available funds for addresses stored in computers

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The DAO Committee multisig has limited funds (~2M right now) and no access to smartcontracts (other than POIs and names bans).
The Agent is controlled by the SAB, requires on-chain transactions to do anything, it has a timelock or requires 5 out of 5 of the signature to pass without timelock.

1 Like