[DAO:e1ff3d8] Proposal for Establishing a Council for Decentraland DAO

Governance
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by 0x511a22cdd2c4ee8357bb02df2578037ffe8a4d8d (ginoct)

Linked Draft Proposal

Proposal for Establishing a Council for Decentraland DAO

Summary

Establish a Council for the DAO to oversee the Executive Arm, approve annual strategies and budgets, and ensure alignment with the DAO’s mission. VP holders (The community) will elect council members and hold the Executive Arm accountable via them.

Abstract

The current governance model of the Decentraland DAO requires VP holders to vote on every proposal, leading to slow processes, lack of accountability, and misalignment with strategic goals. DAO members should vote less on more important stuff to reduce voter fatigue. To professionalize operations, the DAO needs to delegate operational oversight to an Executive Arm. However, for this to function effectively, and be held accountable for its actions, the DAO must first establish a Council of Representatives responsible for hiring, guiding, and, if necessary, replacing the Director of the Executive Arm.

The Council will also oversee the approval of the Executive Arm’s annual strategy and budget, ensuring alignment with the DAO’s mission. Council members will be elected and dismissed through VP voting, ensuring community control while enabling more efficient and professional governance.

Motivation

Currently, the Decentraland DAO expects all VP holders to vote on every proposal, which presents several issues:

  • Inefficiency: The process is slow and cumbersome, delaying critical decisions.
  • Lack of Expertise: Many voters lack the necessary context or skills to make informed decisions, leading to suboptimal outcomes.
  • Time-Consuming: Requiring the full attention of voters on non-critical matters is inefficient and unsustainable. Creates voter fatigue and discourages active participation.
  • No Strategic Direction: There is no clear mechanism to ensure alignment with long-term strategic goals.
  • Diffuse Responsibility: With everyone voting on everything, accountability is diluted, making it difficult to hold anyone responsible for poor performance or missed opportunities.

Specification

Council Composition:

  • The Council will consist of 5 doxxed members who are subject matter experts in areas such as strategic management, finance, creativity, and technology.
  • Members should have a deep understanding of Decentraland’s technology, audience, and stakeholders.
  • Provide representation across different sectors, including the Foundation, MANA/LAND holders, the developer and creators communities, and Decentraland citizens.

Election and Dismissal Process:

  • Council members will be elected through an open call and VP voting. Currently, a hiring proposal requires a minimum of 6 million VP and a one-month voting period.
  • Members can be fired via VP voting through a firing proposal, also requiring 6 million VP and a one-month voting period. Additional options such as ongoing VP backing for Council members could be explored in the Governance proposal.
  • In the event of a Council member’s resignation, the Council must initiate a new open call to fill the position within the following month.

Compensation:

  • Council members will be compensated 1,000 USD per month payable in MANA for their responsibilities and commitment.

Responsibilities of the Council:

  • Hire the Executive Director: The Council will be responsible for hiring, guiding, and, if necessary, replacing the Director of the Executive Arm.
  • Approval of Strategy and Budget: The Council will review, approve, and publish the Annual Strategy Plan and Budget proposed by the Executive Director.
  • Treasury Management: The Council will approve and publish the Treasury Management Strategy to ensure long-term financial sustainability.
  • Formal Oversight: The Council will hold formal meetings every three months with the Executive Director to review progress, and members must be available for individual meetings with the Director as needed.
  • Publishing Reports: The Council will publish regular reports on the status of operations and the treasury, outlining the contributions and decisions made by each member.

Veto Power:

Once the Council approves and publishes the Annual Strategy and Treasury Management Strategy, a veto governance proposal can be initiated within a two-week period of the decision publication date, giving VP holders the chance to block any decision that is misaligned with the DAO’s mission or goals.

Impacts

Best-Case Scenario:
The formation of a Council leads to efficient, strategic guidance within the DAO. By focusing VP holder voting on the election and removal of the council with veto power on important decisions, the DAO reduces voter fatigue while accelerating critical decisions. This setup allows the Council to bring focus and alignment to the DAO’s initiatives, enabling the Executive Arm to act more decisively to support long-term goals and push impactful community projects forward. The Council’s regular reporting and direct accountability to VP holders build community trust and transparency, reducing concerns about centralization.

Possible Scenario:
The Council achieves partial success by reducing voting burdens on VP holders and introducing some guidance on what should be executed while improving the communication between different ecosystem actors. However, some VP holders may feel disengaged due to the shift away from direct voting on operational issues, while others appreciate voting on fewer but more substantial matters. Initial challenges with Council governance, such as defining rules and internal frameworks, could lead to minor inefficiencies but would likely improve as the Council gains experience and community feedback is incorporated. Though progress may be slower than ideal, the structure ultimately provides a degree of alignment and improved transparency, balancing new efficiencies with a learning curve as the Council adapts to its responsibilities.

Worst-Case Scenario:
In a worst-case scenario, the Council’s formation unintentionally causes community members to feel distanced from governance, viewing the shift as overly centralized despite Council accountability measures. If the Council faces internal disagreements or lacks a clear decision-making framework, it could mirror the inefficiencies it was designed to resolve, leading to stagnation or conflicts and not pushing the Executive Arm forward. Without effective communication and transparent reporting, VP holders may lose trust in the Council, resulting in a decline in active participation and a potential long-term drain on community cohesion and resources.

Implementation Pathways

1. Open Call for Council Candidates
The first step is to initiate an open call for Council candidates, allowing any interested members to submit applications on the DAO forum. An application form template will be provided to ensure a consistent and transparent application process. During this phase, candidates will not be required to reveal their identities (doxing), which will only be necessary if they are elected. The application window will remain open for two weeks, allowing ample time for candidates to express their interest.

2. Creation of Hiring Proposals by the DAO Committee
After the application period closes, the DAO Committee will review submissions and create formal hiring proposals for each candidate. These proposals will be published simultaneously on the DAO governance platform for community voting. VP holders will vote to select Council members, with candidates receiving the most VP moving forward, provided they meet eligibility rules. For example, if three out of five most-voted candidates are Decentraland Foundation employees, only the top two will be selected and the third one will be discarded, leaving the seat to the next voted candidate.

3. Initial Council Assembly and Framework Definition
Within one week of Council selection, members will convene to establish initial work guidelines, frameworks, and internal rules. This process will include setting up reporting practices, defining on-chain oversight mechanisms, and internal governance rules. These guidelines will provide a foundation for Council operations and ensure transparent communication with the community from the outset.

4. Drafting Strategic Guidelines and Overseeing Executive Arm Formation
Within 60 days of its formation, the Council will present a draft of strategic guidelines to the community, outlining the DAO’s potential focus areas. Also, if the proposal for creating an Executive Arm passes, the Council will initiate a recruitment process to hire an Executive Director and build the team, adhering to the DAO’s principles of transparency and accountability. These guidelines will serve as a roadmap for the Council and Executive Arm, ensuring alignment with the community’s vision and enabling feedback before formalizing the strategy.

Conclusion

Establishing a Council for the Decentraland DAO is a critical step toward professionalizing the DAO’s governance and improving operational efficiency. By delegating the responsibility of hiring and overseeing the Executive Arm, approving strategic plans, and managing the treasury, the Council will ensure that Decentraland’s operations are aligned with its long-term mission and vision. This proposal seeks to address the inefficiencies of the current system, reduce voter fatigue, and bring accountability to the DAO’s operations while maintaining community control through VP voting mechanisms.

Vote on this proposal on the Decentraland DAO

View this proposal on Snapshot

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Doxxed to who? Like would someone, for example, like @Canessa be eligible who is doxxed to many, particularly the foundation and anyone who has attended the live events, but not to me or most of the community? Because I’d be mostly fine with something like that, or would the people applying to make $1000 a month have to subject themselves to being fully doxxed to the entire community?

I love the DCL community, but there are some crazy people in this space. Having had one of them use my Linkedin photo as their Twitter pfp while tweeting insane things has left me with a desire to warn anyone considering fully doxxing themselves to this community to maybe reconsider. It certainly doesn’t seem like it would be worth $1000.

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There needs to be expiration dates where a vote takes place on whether committee members retain their postion or not. Whether that be 6 months a year or 2 years doesn’t matter but I will not vote yes on anything that does not have a term limit.

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Let’s bring up few disadvantage of this proposal:

  • Potential Centralization Risks: Although accountability mechanisms have been introduced, giving the council greater power in management could make some community members feel deprived of their governance participation, reducing their sense of belonging to the project. If issues arise within the council, this could lead to even greater management risks.
  • Decrease in Voter Engagement: While removing voting on daily operational issues reduces voter fatigue, it may also make some members feel distanced. The lack of voting opportunities could make them feel they have less actual influence on the project, leading to a decline in active participation.(actually we need much more active participants)
  • Initial Governance Adjustment Challenges: In the early stages of the council’s establishment, there will be a need to define internal rules and decision-making frameworks, which could lead to inefficiencies and management challenges. The roles and responsibilities of the council need to be clearly defined, and it will take an adjustment period, which may negatively affect community trust and support.
  • Council Member Representation Issues: The proposal specifies that council members should represent different fields, but without a reasonable screening and open selection mechanism, council members may fail to represent all community stakeholders, leading to governance imbalances.
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Proposal centralizes power by giving significant control to a small group of five council members, leading to reduced community participation. Without clear rules, council members might favor their own interests or those of specific class they represent. All this goes against the DAO’s decentralized nature. Without term limits, these members could remain in power indefinitely like with DAO Committee, reducing accountability and stifling fresh ideas.

There’s a lack of clarity on how DAO approved decisions will be enforced and who is responsible for implementing them. This could result in important proposals being ignored or not acted upon. This is a good example: https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=4f628ce9-ab7f-4aab-abb2-6f10742164e5

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This no longer has anything to do with decentralization. Please think about that when you’re going to vote (But that was already the case with this ill voting system where those with the most property, i.e. with the most VP, have the most power) Just say. Have a nice day.

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Hello, while I support the concept of an executive committee, my concern is that ultimately, one individual from the foundation has control over DAO decisions and funds, as approved here:

Proposal for Establishing a Council for Decentraland DAO

The proposal states that council members will be elected and dismissed through VP voting, which is intended to ensure community control and enable more efficient and professional governance.

However, new members will essentially be elected and approved by a single person holding 8.5M VP. For genuine community control over voting, why not distribute that VP among a broader layer of trusted members who have demonstrated their commitment to Decentraland.

As someone with 6,266 VP, earned through investment in the belief that I would have a say in this DAO, the implication that my vote doesn’t matter is disappointing and contributes to my further disengagement as a community member.
Jenn

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I second jar0d’s question.

Personally, I think it’s disappointing that if someone (who totally isn’t me) happened to have an overreaching non-compete clause in a contract with their current employer, they’d have to put their livelihood at risk to sit on this council.

What level of doxxing are we talking about? Government names? Birthdays? Addresses? Passport numbers? All of the above?

(Edit: Just realized this was already discussed to some degree in the draft…oops. I’ve edited some parts of the above segment of this comment)

For now I’m voting No due to the requirement for people to doxx themselves if they’re not comfortable with doing so.

I guess I missed the part where we discussed this requirement in Lisbon - wasn’t feeling very well at the start of the last day and had to step out.

  • Provide representation across different sectors, including the Foundation, MANA/LAND holders, the developer and creators communities, and Decentraland citizens.

I would be strongly in favor of the requirement for members to have at least two or three of these. A Foundation member who doesn’t own MANA/Land, isn’t a creator, and barely registers as a Decentraland citizen isn’t going to be very in touch with the needs of the platform.

Same could be said for a Decentraland citizen who has no stake in the platform and isn’t familiar with the technicalities of creating things.

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I agree, at least in part. I think each seat should be up for re-election periodically.

I don’t know how I feel about strict term limits, because if someone is doing a good job they should be able to continue doing that job.

But given the reality that a handful of whales (or Esteban) could keep someone elected indefinitely, maybe it would make sense to allow two consecutive terms and then make someone step down for at least one term before being eligible for re-election.

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One of my friends from the polkadot ecosystem doxxed himself for a $500 a month crypto job. One month later he went missing. I started to google who he was and he had school relationships with a lot of early bitcoin millionaires…
So yhhhhh dont dox yourself…
Crypto is anon for a reason…

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In regard to the issue of Doxing, if someone is funded by DAO then we should know who they are. Especially in this role, trust is essential and how can we truly trust someone who will be paid without knowing who that person is? Voting NO but somehow, I think that 8.5M VP will vote this in no matter the opinion of us little guys…

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I feel like “doxxed” is a spectrum

If I have no interaction with you, and neither does the community, then the level of doxxing should be higher then someone like a Canessa, or an Awedjob who have been active and engaged in countless spaces and given us, as a community, a chance to get to know them as an individual.

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It also tells hackers who to target…
There will be a financial reward for successfully targeting them…
Where as true anon would be almost impossible to attack… but thats not going to work for a social job…

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Is there some sort of middle ground we could find where council members are required to dox themselves privately to people in the community who want to know who they are - with the understanding that their personal information won’t be shared publicly unless there is some sort of objective wrongdoing that puts the security of the DAO or its assets at risk?

Like personally I’m fine with anyone in the community knowing who I am, but I don’t want my information publicly searchable on the internet for people who are in no way contributing to this platform. As BET/butter points out, there is a concept in security known as Open Source Intelligence, or OSINT. It’s very common to use publicly available information, particularly on social media networks, to gain an advantage in various social engineering tactics.

I’d happily dox myself to the people on the DCL Trust platform I built (dcltrust.org), because they have demonstrated skin in the game and developed some level of trust in the community. I’d be in favor of some sort of community-run accountability committee to know who the board is but then we run into a “who watches the watchmen” situation. Maybe it’s enough to just have the council doxxed amongst themselves and the Executive Director of the operation arm so they can hold each other accountable with some checks and balances?