by 0xb2223f4038def8a62a86e3c4b108cdfe00a74c4f (Chillin)
Should the problem/opportunity outlined be refined and taken to the next level?
Problem Statement
The Decentraland DAO is currently facing several issues:
Concentration of Power: A small number of people with significant Voting Power (VP) can control decisions, which may conflict with the broader community’s interests and Decentraland’s core values.
Unorganized Roles: There is no clear structure defining who is funded, how much they receive, and for what tasks. This lack of transparency leads to perceptions of bureaucracy and unfairness within the community.
Low Community Participation: There is no clear path for community members to get more involved or advance in the organization.
Too Much Complexity: The grant process is overly complex with excessive steps and rules. So a simple task can take a long time to build.
Lack of Accountability: It’s challenging to hold individuals accountable or remove underperforming members, especially when they operate within teams.
Proposed Solution
The suggestion is to create a Tier Governance System with different levels of participation:
Tier 4: General Contributors
Who?: Everyone starts here.
Tier 3: Recognized Contributors
Who?: Members who have made valuable contributions to the community.
How to join: VP holders vote to approve/revoke/deny applications.
Application: Submit a proposal similar to the “Open Call for Delegates” forum discussion where individuals detailed their work and previous contributions.
Accountability: Can be removed by VP holders if underperforming or acting against community interests.
Benefits:
Eligible for grants up to $5,000 to support their projects (approved by Tier 1 members).
Can help nominate candidates for Tier 2 and Tier 1.
Tier 2: Event Organizers and Specialists
Who they are: Members who organize major events and special projects.
How to join: Approval from Tier 1/2/3 members
Responsibilities:
Organize significant community events (e.g., Fashion Week, Music Festivals).
Moderate community discussions (e.g., Discord).
Benefits:
Receive a monthly payment of $200 (paid in MANA).
Eligible for grants up to $20,000 to support their projects (approved by Tier 1 members).
Can help nominate candidates for Tier 1/2.
Accountability:
Can be removed by VP holders.
Must maintain active participation and meet project goals.
Tier 1: Core Developers and Leaders
Who they are: A group of 10+ highly skilled developers contributing to Decentraland’s core infrastructure and managing tasks each day.
How to join: Decided by Tier 1/2/3 members.
Benefits: Receive a monthly salary of $2,000 ($1,000 in MANA, and $1,000 vested in MANA for 1 year).
Responsibilities:
Manage the DAO’s treasury via a multi-signature wallet (requires approval from 6 out of 10 members for transactions).
Approve grants for community projects.
Mentor members in lower tiers.
Develop and maintain core platform features.
Build towards the community vision.
Accountability:
Can be removed by VP holders if underperforming.
Must adhere to high standards of transparency and effectiveness.
GOD Tier (Visionary Leader)
Who they are: The leader responsible for guiding the long-term vision of Decentraland.
How to join: Tier 1 members do an annual vote.
Benefits: Receive a monthly payment of $2,000 (paid in MANA, vested for 1 year).
Accountability: Can be removed by VP holders or Tier 1 members if underperforming or misaligned with community values.
Responsibilities:
Set the overall direction and strategy for Decentraland.
Represent Decentraland publicly.
Ensure the security and integrity of the platform.
Collaborate closely with Tier 1 members to implement the vision.
Target Audience/Customer Base
Active Contributors and Developers: Individuals already contributing who seek opportunities to advance and have a greater impact.
Community Members: Users who wish to be more involved in decision-making and the future direction of Decentraland.
Voting Power (VP) Holders: Stakeholders and investors who desire a more effective and accountable governance system.
Prospective Contributors: Newcomers looking for clear pathways to contribute and grow within the community.
Why is this relevant now?
With recent talks about creating an “executive arm,” this proposal offers an improved solution while maintaining decentralization values. The purpose of the DAO is to fund people that build the platform.
Improve Efficiency: The DAO needs a better structure to make faster and more effective decisions. We should be able to tell Tier 1 members what we want and see it built quickly. If it is not built, then members could lose their job.
Encourage Fairness: By spreading power more evenly, we promote a more democratic and inclusive community.
Increase Accountability: Clear mechanisms to remove underperforming members ensure that everyone is working towards the same goals.
Simplify Processes: Reducing complexity makes it easier for contributors to participate and for projects to be completed efficiently.
Foster Growth: A structured system attracts more contributors and retains talent, helping Decentraland to grow and improve.
Implementing this tiered system now will address current challenges and position Decentraland for future success. It aligns with our values of decentralization, transparency, and community empowerment. It also positions Decentraland to potentially operate independently of the foundation entirely.
I voted no because I disagree with the system where a select group of people are given the ability to gatekeep the tiers. This will lead to tier members being lobbied by individuals trying to climb the ranks. It would also make it too simple for a few people to stage a hostile takeover of a certain tier.
I would strongly prefer a sybil-resistant, decentralized method of allowing progression through the tiers. Please see my RFC outlining my model for Contribution-Based Incentives:
So it would be very difficult to gatekeep an entire tier…
VP holders can always remove any individual.
(Also possible for someone to be removed via the tier members with 1 vote per person)
So you would not only need political power but also the financial power.
Then if that happens then their could be a vote amongst all the members to remove that corrupt person.
So how it would work is kinda like this:
The smart contract would be deployed. And in the contract it will need X amount of tier 3s, tier 2s and tier1s before the contract starts operating.
Let’s say we have 100 tier 3s 20 tier 2s and 10 tier 1s…
Then the multisig is shared amongst the tier 1s…
This is about as decentralized as it can be…
If anyone is corrupt then it will be public knowledge.
The problem with your proposal is that it comes with a “board of advisors”…
What if this board of advisors don’t work very hard. Then how do we get rid of them?
And why would that board ever give up their power?
You could probably mix my proposal with your one if you wanted…
My one is more about the structure. Yours is more about incentivizing people.
I voted no because I read this proposal and Unknower’s plan for Contribution-Based Incentives. This discussion and everyone contributing their vote and opinion is needed.
Our path is surviving evolution by adapting to challenges. We require an efficient path forward to encourage people with positive growth potential for our ecosystem and disincentivize those who want to rob us.
The lessons we learn and our collective response will either be lessons that are part of our history (examples to other projects and even the governments of Earth) or lessons for others to learn, from our failure.
I read both and like yours but I think a plan with more Sybil protection is needed. With the recent attack on X and examples where other projects were taken over due to governance attacks, i feel this is a critical element that needs to be discussed openly with the community.
I like that you wrote as a starting place that can be refined but ultimately voted no because i think we need more ground-up consideration of things. I feel you posting this proposal is kicking off this discussion, which is greatly needed.
I feel Unknower posted elements that maybe shouldb be heavily integrated into any broad governance changes.
I feel the idea of exclusive tier-based voting could be taken advantage of. I feel Unknowers idea of voting weight being determined by ownership and on-platform involvement, that dissapates over times of absence, is good. Maybe something in-between?
We always need some way of communicating with the foundation… So you always need some kind of risk no matter what…
In my proposal the Multisig is the main type of sybil protection…
Also the way that individuals need to prove their history to get into the tiers is also a form of sybil protection… It’s about as good as it can be honestly…
Very cool, and nice work! I look forward to this discussion and everyone’s thoughts. I certainly do not know the best method for growth and security, but I am looking forward to learning from this discussion.
I personally thought it was a decent tier structure all the way until tier one.
It seems like tier one and God tier could easily be hijacked by bad actors with a lot VP. In other words if we don’t fix our broken voting structure this tier based system will just create a disaster, and give power to the wrong people. within this model I don’t think a god tier should exist since their responsibilities fall in line with what Foundation does for the product, and they are not required to do anything that the DAO says.
I was also wondering who enforces all this? to my understanding tier 1 eliminates the current operational arm in our DAO, so who will be the one set up the multi sig wallets. how will the power to the DAO contracts be passed over? How will we make sure the new holders of the information will be held accountable of any wrong doings?
I also feel like there needs to be a different way of electing members into the different tiers besides voting power. perhaps a Karma based structure would be better or if there is an experience based structure that can be developed that would be a better way to elect members into different tiers.
I know this was mentioned earlier in the forums post about the CBI model that @Unknower is concepting (which i have read and have provided feedback to) maybe, if its possible the 2 of you can join forces to develop the what the next version of this conversation will look like.
So to get to tier 1 it’s not just about VP… It’s also about community involvement.
To get to tier 1 you will need to be voted in by the other tiers.
“How to join: Decided by Tier 1/2/3 members.”
So if you have a lot of VP… You “could” be corrupt. But you would only be damaging your own investment. So probably not a smart idea.
But if you did do that here’s how it would look.
You’d have to add 100s of fake tier members at the same time. (Which there will be limits for, so it might take a while)
Then once you’ve got 100s of fake tier 3 accounts. (Starting to look obvious)
Then you would vote your fake accounts into the tier 1s.
Then once you have the majority, you could start making fake grants and paying yourself. (very obvious)
The god tier is similar to the (more centralized) “directors” position in the executive arm. Something that has already been approved. Like a CEO. When we’re dealing with $m’s, we really do need leadership. We can’t all be trying to scratch at the funds with such a variety of different ideas. We need to convince the CEO (CEO is lame. GOD is great.) that the funds are necessary. If the CEO says no then the developers can move on and build something else.
So this whole tier structure would be in a smart contract. Once X amount of tier 1s are available. Then the multisig will initiate amongst the tier 1s. This would probably start off with $10k in the pot. See how it goes. Then eventually the funds are fully converted over. Along with the marketplace contracts etc.
The best way to do the voting is a percentage based structure. YW
