[DAO:da0c219] DAO Committee Deprecation & Replacement

Governance
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by 0x8dd060ad7f867ad890490fd87657c1b7e63c622f (Jungle)

DAO Committee Deprecation & Replacement

Summary

We propose to deprecate the DAO Committee and migrate its execution-only duties to a lean 3-of-5 operational multisig that reflects ecosystem representation. This change preserves the Council’s approve/oversee role and enforces fund-scoped execution. Net effect: the DAO’s operating model becomes clearer, safer, and faster.

Abstract

The DAO Committee historically acted as an operational and governance-enactment body: executing transactions, paying grants, and coordinating treasury operations. With the discontinuation of the grants program and the creation of the DAO Council, the Committee’s scope has significantly diminished.

This proposal introduces a transition strategy that retires the DAO Committee in its current form while reassigning execution responsibilities to a hybrid multisig structure composed of trusted representatives from existing entities within the Decentraland ecosystem. The proposed multisig will consist of trusted representatives from the DAO Council, the Security Advisory Board (SAB), the Decentraland Foundation, and 1 former DAO Committee member, forming a balanced and technically competent 3-of-5 multisig structure.

Motivation

The DAO Committee was once central to Decentraland’s operations: managing grants, paying contributors, executing transactions, and acting as a safeguard to ensure community-approved proposals were responsibly enacted. However, this role has fundamentally changed.

  • Reduced Scope: With no grants program and significantly fewer operational transactions, the workload and responsibility no longer justify the current structure or its $2.4k USD in MANA/month compensation per member (3 members → roughly 9k a month).

  • Legacy Role: The Committee historically coordinated treasury-related execution to enact community-approved decisions. Going forward, the Council sets mandates and provides oversight; execution remains with the operational multisig as defined in this proposal.

The DAO’s evolution now requires a leaner, more transparent mechanism. Transitioning to a council-driven multisig mitigates these risks while ensuring operational continuity.

The new multisig model offers clear benefits:

  • Representation: Aligns execution with representatives from major stakeholder entities across the project.

  • Accountability: Authority is distributed, reducing risks of over-concentration.

  • Continuity: Retains one former Committee member to ensure workflow continuity and a smooth handover.

  • Cost Alignment: Updates compensation to reflect the reduced scope and new responsibilities.

Specification

  1. Deprecation of the DAO Committee

    • Disband the Committee as an operational and decision-making body.

    • Transition its functions to the newly appointed multisig structure, while retaining the existing operational multisigs on both Ethereum and Polygon to ensure continuity.

  2. Multisig Configuration

    • Structure: The multisig will operate as 3-of-5, retaining the existing operational multisigs on Ethereum and Polygon for continuity.

    • Designation: Signers will be appointed at the DAO Council’s discretion, following standard security practices, and may be rotated or replaced by the Council to maintain security and liveness.

    • Members will be designated as follows:

      • 2 current DAO Council members

      • 1 appointed SAB member

      • 1 appointed Foundation representative

      • 1 former DAO Committee member

  3. Responsibilities:

    • Execute all on-chain transactions required to enact:
      (a) passed governance proposals, and
      (b) Council-approved mandates (treasury management strategies, operational budgets, etc)
    • No policy-making power. The operational multisig does not approve plans or re-interpret mandates.

  4. Signer Replacement Procedure

    • In the event of resignation or removal, the DAO Council will appoint replacements through an internal vote.

  5. Compensation

    • Multisig signer responsibilities can be divided into two categories:

      • Passive tasks: Infrequent actions such as authorizing transfers replenishing the operating wallets. These are on-demand responsibilities and do not require continuous involvement. For these roles, compensation will be limited to reimbursing any transaction fees incurred.

      • Active tasks: Ongoing operational actions such as executing monthly compensations and handling smaller recurring payments or operations. These require consistent engagement. To ensure continuity, one signer will be designated as the “operator” of the operating wallet, with a defined compensation to reflect the more active nature of this role.

      This structure balances fairness, ensures costs are covered, and recognizes the difference between occasional signers and those taking on day-to-day operational duties.

Impacts

  • Operational Agility: Faster execution DAO mandated proposals and treasury transactions, reducing unnecessary delays and bottlenecks.

  • Balanced Authority: Distributes trust into trusted members across the DAO Council, SAB, Foundation, and former Committee member, avoiding over-concentration.

  • Continuity: Retains one former DAO Committee member for institutional knowledge.

  • Cost Alignment: Adjusts compensation to reflect reduced responsibilities, ensuring sustainability.

Implementation Pathway

Until completion of the handover, the current DAO Committee remains the executor of transactions from the DAO Treasury, under Council mandates. Upon completion, the new operational multisig assumes that execution role as specified.

  1. DAO Committee Offboarding

    • Revoke existing DAO Committee signer permissions and replace them with newly designated signers.

    • Revoke remaining Committee permissions once the handover is complete.

    • Discontinue DAO Committee compensation.

  2. Multisig Configuration

    • Implement designated representatives into the new 3-of-5 multisig.

    • Update documentation and signer records.

  3. Public Announcement

    • Publish the new structure, disclose signer addresses, and responsibilities on the DAO governance forum and official channels.
  • FOR
  • AGAINST
  • Invalid question/options

Vote on this proposal on the Decentraland DAO

View this proposal on Snapshot

1 Like
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Would there be clear definitions about the makeup of the signers that require you to replace any signer with someone who filled a similar role, as an example: If a SAB signing member resigned, would you fill that position with another SAB member, or would future candidates be selected from all potential signers?

Just curious and want to make sure there isn’t an argument in 3-10 years from now when someone actually retires :sweat_smile:

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I think it’s important for this proposal to clarify that no appointed members should have a dual role (Appointed SAB member should not be Foundation or Council member, appointed Foundation member should not be SAB or Council member). Also it would be goo to clarify what if no DAO Committee, Foundation or SAB members want to be part of this structure.

Additionally, all appointed members should be public (and KYC’d to the DAO Council), and there should be a mechanism to inform the community about their operations and movements.

It would also be valuable to expand on the strategy for deprecating the DAO Committee. For example, the DAO currently has two main properties: the Aragon DAO Treasury (where a large portion of the treasury is held) and the operational multisigs. The multisigs can be easily replaced by this new structure, but what will happen with Aragon? The Aragon Treasury is not actually controlled by the DAO Committee but by three current or former Foundation employees (one of them being a DAO Committee member). How will that work going forward? Will all the new multisig signers have access to Aragon?

This proposal goes in the right direction, but it would be beneficial to flesh out some details so that everyone can make an informed vote.

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Thanks for the feedback and thanks for bringing the Aragon issue!

*The following comments reflect my personal opinion and may not represent the Council’s official position.

Would there be clear definitions about the makeup of the signers that require you to replace any signer with someone who filled a similar role, as an example: If a SAB signing member resigned, would you fill that position with another SAB member, or would future candidates be selected from all potential signers?

The preferred approach will be to follow the reasoning: ‘If a SAB signing member resigns, that position will be filled by another SAB member’. However, if that is not possible, the Council will be responsible for appointing another signer.

I think it’s important for this proposal to clarify that no appointed members should have a dual role (Appointed SAB member should not be Foundation or Council member, appointed Foundation member should not be SAB or Council member). Also it would be goo to clarify what if no DAO Committee, Foundation or SAB members want to be part of this structure.

Additionally, all appointed members should be public (and KYC’d to the DAO Council), and there should be a mechanism to inform the community about their operations and movements.

Will start working on this, we didn’t dive into those specs because didn’t want to overcomplicate things at this stage, but definitely adding it into an eventual Draft Proposal.

It would also be valuable to expand on the strategy for deprecating the DAO Committee. For example, the DAO currently has two main properties: the Aragon DAO Treasury (where a large portion of the treasury is held) and the operational multisigs. The multisigs can be easily replaced by this new structure, but what will happen with Aragon? The Aragon Treasury is not actually controlled by the DAO Committee but by three current or former Foundation employees (one of them being a DAO Committee member). How will that work going forward? Will all the new multisig signers have access to Aragon?

As you pointed out, replacing the signers in operational multisigs is quite simple. Regarding the Aragon agent, we followed the same reasoning and preferred to address it in a separate proposal to ensure proper discussions on a topic that could actually give the DAO real control over the largest part of the treasury.

We’re currently exploring different solutions that would transfer full ownership to the DAO without compromising security or the battle-tested system that the Aragon agent has proven to be. The solutions we’re exploring involve different multisig signer configurations, some of which are not council-centric,.

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Thanks! I know you personally are, but it would be good to engage with the Aragon core team to get their advice when the time comes.

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Yes, the right direction to your private wallet , as what happened with the 1.3 Million dollars.

do you mean the council wallet that already sent individual 1.3 million probably with dicord message with no track, questions or vote. but more as a friendly gift!!

let me guess, I think I can name all five friends right now without even waiting for the “announcement.“

So just to be clear , as I understand it, you guys take over the treasury, and then any amount the Council decides to spend just gets spent directly , no questions, no proposals? Sounds exactly like what’s happening now: millions moved between friends with no tracking. Feels more like opening Ali Baba’s cave.

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And as I mentioned on Discord, in your own Executive Arm proposal, nowhere did it say the Council would replace the SAB. The SAB was meant to remain the independent custodian of the DAO treasury, separate from the Council & Executive Arm. Any attempt to spin this differently only reduces trust further , which, for me, is already completely gone. At this point, I can only call it what it looks like: an organized scam to take over the treasury left.

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@Agus you as current SAB member, when DAO moved $23M Mana to the Council wallet that you sit on, I believed it would be in good hands. You were supposed to be the protector and auditor ensuring this money was used wisely. Instead, we’ve seen funds moving irresponsibly, untracked, with zero follow-up, votes, or answers to my questions.

Your role as a SAB member should be re-evaluated, because what we are seeing is the opposite of safeguarding. And your role in the Council, in my opinion as a community member, has completely lost any trust — it has shown nothing to suggest you can deliver anything other than attempts to get more control over the treasury, topped off with a “treasury management strategy” that shows no real planning or expertise , other than just a plan to dump 60% of the treasury at any price.

Unfortunately, I was one of the people who voted for you to join the Council , which now feels like a mistake on my part as well. Good luck with that.

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This a YES from me and we all know why. It has been 18 MONTHS and two Proposals that was voted Yes on by the community and passed have STILL NOT BEEN ENACTED by DAO Commitee.

Been trying to bring all the top NFT collections communities (Crpto Punks) (Bored Ape Yacht Club) etc to Decentraland for 3+ Years and did the impossible and got written permission which was requested by @yemel and I did. And all 30,000+ 3D GLB molds have been made dozens of times until approval to work in Decentraland and now do. But Foundation and all other committee hands are tied because DAO Committee wont enact the contracts. STILL.

I honestly dont care they all get paid the $9,000 a month or whatever and if they do, good for them lol. This is just my main issue they are forcing me to care about. Them choosing to not enact contracts even when the community voted Yes to do it. I have to ask then, what is the point?? Isn’t this like by definition abuse of power? This may not pass and they will continue to keep this goin then, it is what it is and was worth the shot. I owe it to our teams hard work all these years to try and vote. But If this does end this committee then I wish them well and hope they continue to find success in whatever they do since they are talented people. But this has been our biggest hurdle for over a year now and I can see this being the only solution to get us through this 3 Year + long journey. :saluting_face: :orange_heart:

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*The following comments reflect my personal opinion and may not represent the Council’s official position.

@Rizk: I hear you. Change is uncomfortable — it pushes us out of familiar patterns. I’m grateful to those who’ve served in Committee roles; their work remains part of our community. But the legacy signatory layer has been drawing budget without clear delivery value, and that requires resolution. Let’s stay grounded in the community’s mandate and address concerns directly.

Here’s the reality: the DAO elected a Council to provide oversight and strategy, and created Regenesis Labs to deliver. The chain is simple: DAO → Council (oversight) → Executive arm (delivery). As Maraoz noted, execution stalls when a legacy signatory can override Council-approved direction. Our goal is to end this deadlock, ensure continuity, and align authority with the mandate — without eroding accountability or exposing the treasury to undue risk.

This is not a “power grab.” The Council isn’t centralizing power; it’s formalizing accountability while leaving the community as the ultimate check. To reinforce this, we’re introducing a community veto: a clear, time-bound mechanism for objections, ensuring oversight without re-introducing the same deadlock we’re solving.

This won’t be the Council’s last proposal. Next, we’ll tackle the Aragon DAO Treasury setup, exploring options that strengthen DAO control while keeping security and balance.

On specific claims:

  • “Funds moved irresponsibly/untracked.” All movements are on‑chain and tied to the published Executive Arm budget and program. If any transaction seems unclear, point to the TX and we will make sure public context is added in the corresponding monthly update. For clarity, as Gino communicated: the Operational Wallet was part of the original 18‑month operating budget. The first treasury→operational transfers happened in June, requested by Regenesis and approved by the Council, and signed by two Council members plus Regenesis. All movements are on‑chain. All vendor payments are invoiced and paid on‑chain via Request.finance; Regenesis Labs will link invoice references in monthly updates where helpful.

  • “There were no votes.” The Council Charter, strategy, and budget were published for community review. No objections requiring escalation were filed under the process in place at the time. The pending veto proposal makes a clear objection path explicit going forward.

  • “Treasury plan ‘dumps 60% at any price.’” That’s a total mischaracterization. The Treasury Management Strategy is an ongoing effort for careful, staged diversification over ~18 months with liquidity awareness and stability as priorities. It strengthens resilience; it doesn’t abandon MANA. We are setting up the needed structure and working closely with third‑party providers on a well advised set of actions that will be disclosed in a timely manner to the community. In addition to this point: Regenesis does not set DAO Treasury funds. The Council sets strategy; Regenesis only facilitates the third‑party provider relationship. Custody remains outside Regenesis.

On your transparency concerns:

  • A community veto adds a real check without overlapping approvals.

  • The Council is a board, not an ops team; we approve strategy, not invoice-level audits.

  • A public dashboard and quarterly reports (first due in October) provide visibility.

  • Publishing Council votes is fair, and we will move toward that.

Let’s keep this constructive. If you think I’ve lost community trust, you can call a poll to replace me. If you see a better governance model than a Council, draft it for community approval.

We can disagree on tactics, but the direction is clear: resolve the deadlock and keep improving delivery.

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He says while giving away a quarter million a year to two people.

Sight requires eyes, not hands, stop trying to be hands-on the DAO and power tripping.

Totally a power grab. Totally centralizing power.

Yup, totally powergrab, the Aragon DAO is literally what’s keeping us a DAO, it’s security is proven and anything else will put in danger the whole DAO treasury, you’re powertripping and wanting full control and removing all ways for the community to veto anything.

That’s going against what the Council was made for, here is an extract from the Council governance proposal:

Treasury Management: The Council will approve and publish the Treasury Management Strategy to ensure long-term financial sustainability.

”APPROVE” not write, you are clearly not qualified for this.

A community veto is useless if there is no way to enforce it, and your powertripping is leading you to try to remove all ways to enforce it.

The community will have NO recourse if there is not an independent entity to act.

You are clearly not independent and will not care about a community veto as there will be literally no way for the community to enforce anything whatsoever.

You can keep taking any drugs you want, it’s simply not happening Agus. You will not get full control over the whole DAO and its funds.

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Hey, Agus. What do you mean by this? It’s a bit strange to suggest this without further explanation.

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For real, if the Council is willing to replace the DAO committee, how is it even possible to mention such a thing without being more specific? Are we sure the problem is the DAO Committee’s power “being incompatible” with the Council, its salary, or are you trying to do something else that we are not aware of? Please tell me this is a communication issue because it looks sketchy. If the community rises questions about transparency, saying this like if it was nothing is wild. And I’m saying this as someone who supports the OpCo and Gino.

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My vote in this case is against but doesn’t seem to matter as it is not being accepted.

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Yes , especially when it’s done by people who are unprepared, unprofessional, and unaware of what they are doing, as it is in our case.

You mean individual wallet direction, where decisions are made privately and funds flow without any real community oversight.

Let me explain this to people:

  • Deadlock : he means the DAO Committee that prevented them from draining $70M Mana of the treasury. but they managed to move $23M into their control, and are now spending it however they wish, no explanation of where the funds have gone.
  • ensure continuity : you mean continuity of the money flow with no restrictions, proposals, or accountability , letting one individual or a small group spend as they wish??
  • Align authority : You mean authority and full control of the treasury under a council that can act without community consent, proposals, or even votes , as it happen over the past few months.

I have no doubt that you’ll keep digging until you find a way to open Ali Baba’s Cave , but thanks for saying it clearly so everyone can see the direction you’re taking.

I wish you were as obsessed with building Regenesis Labs as you are with taking over the entire treasury. It’s honestly pathetic to see this coming from someone who is supposed to be a SAB member, a role meant to protect the treasury, not help drain it.

Your answers are nothing but nonsense at this point. I won’t go through them again — I feel like I’m going in circles, having to explain your own proposal back to you. It’s honestly disappointing that I even have to explain to you how these processes are supposed to work.

Yes please, every single penny :slightly_smiling_face: , that will be a good beginning

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TBH, it’s needed. This 3/5 setup is clearly not working and must be revised sooner rather than later. but I’ll leave this to the community for now, and I will continue reporting to make sure every dollar is accounted for, every vote is transparent, and every decision to move millions into a single wallet is explained, along with the many other questions you’ve ignored.

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I experienced the same thing often as well. An alternative method is to vote directly via the snapshot site. Here’s a link to it.

https://snapshot.box/#/s:snapshot.dcl.eth

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I strongly support this proposal to deprecate the DAO Committee and transition to a more streamlined operational structure.

1. Evolution of Responsibilities and Redundancy

The DAO Committee’s original mandate was managing grants, executing payments, and handling operational tasks. The most important aspect when voting for their members, first and foremost, is for them to be honest, operative, and having the project’s best interests at heart.

With the grants program discontinued and the establishment of both the DAO Council and Regenesis Labs, the Committee’s responsibilities overlap with the Council. As clearly stated in the Executive Arm proposal, treasury management now falls under the Council’s purview. The Committee maintaining veto power over Council-approved operations creates a dual-approval system that wasn’t intended.

A clear example of everyone acting on the best intentions, but clashing due to a difference of opinions and roles in a system that was broken was maraoz’s resignation.

2. Case Study: Regenesis Labs funding

The sequence of events around Regenesis Labs funding illustrates precisely why this change is needed:

  • The community elected a Council with a clear mandate to oversee treasury strategy.

  • When the Council moved to fund Regenesis Labs per their approved plan, the Committee asserted blocking authority. I agree with how they acted; they were properly protecting the Treasury from mismanagement, acting according to their role.

  • This ambiguity forced a two-month delay. As a direct consequence of this, maraoz ragequits. I also agree with him. If all decisions take 3 months to be enacted, you can only make ~4 decisions a year and we get too old before making the project great.

  • Now, accusations of “mismanagement” circulate, which Gino thoroughly debunked with on-chain evidence showing all transfers were Council-approved, properly signed, and aligned with the published operational structure.

Having two bodies claim authority over treasury execution creates deadlock, not protection.

3. On Aragon

Here’s an overlooked point: Decentraland remains the largest active user of Aragon V1, a system quite outdated. Even the current Aragon team doesn’t fully understand it, and this represents significant technical risk. We need to migrate away from this legacy infrastructure before it becomes a liability. An “ecosystem multisig” with well-known good actors is, in my opinion, a good-enough solution. I’d like to offer some help on the future stages of this proposal, because the situation is quite critical. Maybe we should not conflate both proposals.

TL;DR: while I cherish and approve of the good intentions of the Committee, tasked with protecting the DAO Treasury, I also believe we need to move faster for the project to have a better future, thus, we should wind it down

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Maraoz’s childish resignation was purely as a political move, and it’s working…

No, it didn’t. It took less than a month between the moment they asked for it, having discussions to decide what was the path forward, deal with maraoz’s puerile resignation, doing the proposal and doing the 7 millions USD transfer.
Also worth to mention that THE MULTISIG WASN’T EVEN READY WHEN THEY ASKED FOR THE TRANSFER.

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May 19th

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The Council multisig was only properly setup on June 11th

First test transfer was done on June 12th
Full transfer was started on June 13th and enacted early on June 15th
Also worth mentioning I pinged Esteban, Yemel and Agus while doing that transfer to double check if the $7M transfer was correct and got no response :slight_smile: Thanks to Nacho for taking time, while he was not supposed to work, to check it.

The committee protected the funds from being sent to an unsafe wallet, while no veto process was in place and did the transfer in a very timely manner.

The Council/OpCo has done many many very questionable decisions, most likely unintentionally but not having an independent entity to double check is extremely dangerous.

Not sure why we are encouraging the behavior of doing millions dollars transfers from the DAO via a couple discord private messages and shooting down the people who double check, but hey, not my problem anymore it seems

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Let’s try to keep it amicable and highlight the benefits to the project. I understand that in your role you want to keep the funds safe. Please also understand that maraoz sees more danger in moving slow, and that his role was to upkeep the future of the project.

I don’t think (and it’s not my place to judge) that either stance is dumb, childish or self-serving.

Yes, because we’ve been abusing the governance three-stage process and voted it on top of this draft; which already has 8+ governance proposals on top of it (each council vote, etc).

Last message I got from you was June 3rd.

I disagree, if anything they did wrong, is that they’ve moved too slow. But yes, there are some legal stuff that also held them down.

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and protecting the treasury from bad actions like the one we are seeing now from your people supported by you.

wrong that was you who elected them ..

There was no delay of more than two weeks. They already have $7 million, so there is no need to allocate more funds before we evaluate their performance over the next 18 months — and so far, their work has been disappointing.

I will consider this as a joke, because thats not how companies are established ,’’ follow the on-chain’’ i already did and found nothing.

faster !!?? they have already 7 million dollars why they dont move faster …. all those excuses doesnt work for me, give more than 90 million mana and they have barely started since two months ago.

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as i said in discord, in ([ Executive Arm Proposal](Establishing an Executive Arm to improve DAO Operations. " Executive Arm Proposal

(Establishing an Executive Arm to improve DAO Operations)")), Nowhere did it say the Council would replace the SAB. The SAB was meant to remain the custodian of the DAO treasury, independent of the Executive Arm. Trying to suggest otherwise is just playing with words.

to sum up …

I have asked many questions, but received either no direct answers or nonsensical replies like yours :slightly_smiling_face: . Therefore, no more funds will be allocated to them until the 18-month period is completed and their work is re-evaluated. I am confident that $7 million is more than enough to put in the hands of a few incapable people.

I have been in Decentraland since late 2017, built thousands of lands, and have definitely built more than you in this project. I have won tens of prizes , most of them top 3 (here), so I know enough to say that you are a very clever coder but lack management and leadership skills. Please stay away and let me handle things as I am doing now, just as I pushed the council to start acting (here).

.

.

BTW, since you are on-chain guy, can you let me know why gino wallet drop -350k dollars in two weeks after my last report on discord (here)

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Iam still waiting the detailed expenses , hopfully to get in 2025 :slightly_smiling_face:

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Ok, I see, hope he meant this cause the way he said it, in the context of the conversation, sounded wrong to me.

Please be more clear when making statements on sensitive topics.