[DAO:75bf068] [ADDENDUM] Establishing an Executive Arm to improve DAO Operations

Governance
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by 0xd6c957f9a6411f35d01baae2658758f277408878 (Rizk)

Linked Draft Proposal

Establishing an Executive Arm to improve DAO Operations

Summary

This addendum requests approval to transfer 23,716,538 MANA (or DAI equivalent) from the DAO Treasury to the Council/Regenesis Lab multi-sig wallet to activate and fund the Executive Arm, as already approved by the DAO Council.

Abstract

This updated section was prepared by the DAO Committee following the Council + Regenesis Labs forming, in consultation with the Council, DAO Committee, and the new Executive Director. It includes specific legal, procedural, and financial clarifications to:

  • · Ensure transparent execution of the approved transfer.
  • · Avoid any legal ambiguity or procedural misunderstandings regarding fund transfers.
  • · Align DAO actions with the intent already expressed by the Council and the broader community

To enable this transaction, and for the purposes of this and future proposals, Regenesis Labs is explicitly considered as exempt from the “Limit Fund” rule (Limit Fund Appropriation to Grant Proposals), alongside other delineated cases, as it represents the central structure for budgeting strategies and treasury management. Given its role as the primary vehicle for fund allocation within the ecosystem, this transfer is presented as part of Regenesis Lab’s operational mandate, consistent with its broader responsibility to execute strategic financial decisions on behalf of the DAO.

Motivation

The Executive Arm (Regenisis Labs) cannot operate without funding. This transfer enables the onboarding of qualified operational contributors, activates approved processes, and ensures timely action on proposals already passed by the DAO.
By allowing this Regenesis Labs exception, the DAO maintains rule integrity while enabling urgent operational continuity. And keep the tracking of 23,716,538 MANA transfers on chain and not only on the Forum.

Specification

Transfer & Exemption Details:

  • · Amount: 23,716,538 MANA or its DAI equivalent
  • · Recipient: Regenesis Lab / Council Multi-sig
    0x93AcCD5b8AEE795C6efcfdEDFE4a292e59e00e84
    The wallet will be set up as a 3 out of 5 with at least two members of the DAO Council as signers.
  • · Purpose: Initial operational funding for the Executive Arm (Regenisis Labs)
  • · Scope: Regenesis Labs is explicitly exempt from the (Limit Fund Appropriation to Grant Proposals), rule for this and future proposals, in line with its mandate as the DAO’s budgeting and treasury execution body.

Impacts

â—Ź Enables activation of the Regenesis Labs to carry out DAO operations efficiently
● Complies with the DAO Council’s approved direction and Regenesis discussions
â—Ź Provides legal clarity to avoid future procedural or legal misunderstandings
● Grants a transparent exemption from the “Limit Fund Appropriation to Grant Proposals” rule to enable strategic execution of financial decisions on behalf of the DAO.

Implementation Pathways

  • Upon passage, the DAO Committee, in coordination with the SAB, will execute the transfer from the DAO treasury to the mentioned Regenesis Lab / Council Multi-sig wallet (0x93AcCD5b8AEE795C6efcfdEDFE4a292e59e00e84).
  • A transparency report will be published post-transfer
  • All subsequent funding actions remain subject to normal governance rules.

Conclusion

This addendum, when combined with the previously submitted ( Establishing an Executive Arm to improve DAO Operations ) , provides a complete and actionable framework to launch the Executive Arm of the DAO. While the main proposal outlines its structure, scope, and responsibilities, this Addendum delivers the essential funding mechanism and a clear procedural exemption to enable its activation.

Together, they ensure that the DAO:

  • Empowers the Executive Arm with both authority and resources
  • Maintains legal and governance clarity
  • Respects the DAO’s rules while allowing for urgent, and exemption.
  • Approves the transfer of Council approved budget to the Regenesis Lab wallet

Approving this addendum allows the DAO to move from planning to action—marking a critical step toward strengthening Decentraland’s operations, transparency, and long-term sustainability.

Vote on this proposal on the Decentraland DAO

View this proposal on Snapshot

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Disagree with the (or DAI equivalent) statement because it makes things confusing..
Or DAI equivalent based on what? Market value? Based on where?
Why don’t we focus on paying people in MANA. If the builders don’t believe in the token then the money will be wasted.

Do you guys need all this money now?
Or are we just over-estimating to make sure that the Executive Arm can maintain it’s strong political position for a long time?

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Hi @BET, the “DAI equivalent” reference means that the DAO Committee will transfer just the portion of funds needed to cover salaries and services from May in stablecoins. This is because the Committee already has the mechanisms to do so, and Regenesis Labs, as an entity, does not.

Since the DAO Committee requested this proposal, which delayed Regenesis Labs’ funding and, as a result, the monthly compensation, I’ve asked the Committee members to simplify things by transferring a percentage in stablecoins so I can proceed with payments immediately. The remainder of the funds will be transferred in MANA.

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Forgive my confusion but you didn’t really answer any of my questions..

So let me clarify this:

2022: People were voted in to manage the budget.. They claimed it was a success but people left decentraland because they wasn’t getting paid for their work. Which resulted in more people leaving due to lack of content.
2023: We implement an upgrade that destroyed everyone’s builds. Forcing developers to rebuild. More people left.
2024: People were starting to question where the $m’s were being spent. Turns out it was mainly on salaries. Hence the $9k a month meme. Various grants were starting to build up and the content provided was insufficient. If those same people were to ask for more $ then it would of destroyed the DAO because people didn’t believe in the competency of the people in charge. We all agreed that grants should be paused. No more money was to be spent.
2025: A new vision is proposed by the same people that were on the payroll before. A lot of people are sceptical about the branding of an executive arm and the over-reach that they will have. It is voted in and now these same people are back on their salaries.

Why did we do all of that circus to leave the unsuccessful grant system just to pay the same people to do the same jobs that didn’t work before?

1 Like
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Oh, didn’t answer your question because you hadn’t asked this question before. Here are my thoughts:

Who was voted to manage the budget? And who wasn’t getting paid for their work? The budget was distributed through open community voting on proposals. The GSS was responsible for ensuring grantees fulfilled their commitments, and they did (They actually recovered more than $800K for the DAO treasury, they basically paid themselves for their work by recovering more than they spent). The problem is not about the deliverables, but the lack of strategy. No one was tasked with the objective of setting up strategies for what the DAO should invest in. Now we have the DAO Council to set up the strategy, and Regenesis Labs as a tool to allocate resources to projects.

Agree with this, but the DAO did what they could: Funded a team tasked with the mission of helping builders to migrate from SDK6 to SDK7 was created and did a pretty good job. You can check their updates here or browse the repository to see all the scenes they migrated.

Could you back this statement with data? Because I can prove you wrong right away: If you consider all the Core Units grants (I guess that’s what you refer to with “people on the payroll”, and let me clarify, being a grantee is waaaaay different from being on a payroll) they account for $1.6M over 3 years, that’s about 11.1% of the funds distributed via the Grants program.

None of the previous core units remain active, except the Protocol Squad, which is building something that both I and the DAO Council (elected by the community) consider critical to Decentraland’s future, that is a VR, a mobile and a web client in case the existing web client gets deprecated by Foundation. I’ve been hired to do something different than what I’ve been doing in the past as a Product Manager, so I don’t think that applies.

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I vote ABSTAIN and stand with @maraoz :saluting_face: :orange_heart: he is right. This corruption has gone on long enough.

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@PunkPink Hi! I’d like to understand your concerns and try to address any doubts you might have. Let me know!

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Hello Gino, thank you for your interest.

I think that the Council members should be the ones with the 5 signatures, since granting 3 signatures to someone other than them could invalidate certain Council decisions.

I want to remind that the current Council was elected by voters, and this distribution of signers would trivialize the entire governance process we go through to elect representatives.

Could you share the reasons for this decision?

1 Like
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Hi @PunkPink, just to clarify: the multisig wallet we’re referring to is the one holding the operational budget for the Executive Arm (Regenesis Labs). That’s why it requires signatures from members of that organization.

Some Council members are also signers of the wallet, which ensures that the community retains oversight of these funds. For example, if someone attempted to misuse the funds, the Council signers could block the transaction.

If the wallet were composed only of Council members, how would Regenesis Labs be expected to operate? It would be inefficient to request Council approval every time we need to pay a salary, cover a subscription, or handle routine expenses.

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That highly depend how the multisig is setup, with a vanilla Gnosis Safe 3-out-of-5 the Executive Arm could just transfer all the funds and the council would have no way to block it.
If we cared about the safety of the funds against misuses, we would simply not transfer it all at once.
Unless you use something like SnapSafe but in which case it would be composed of only Council members I think.
We might as well have the multisig only composed of OpCo members as with a 3-out-5 setup and 2 members of the council in it, in case of a full veto, if the OpCo don’t want to send back the funds the Council can’t do anything about it anyways.

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The setup for the time being is:

This will work for now, where at least 1 Council signature is required. Once we get to the point where we have 3 trusted Regenesis Labs signatures and the power balance of this multisig is modified, we will either have to use SafeSnap (I think it’s too complex for our use case) or code a custom module to allow some signers to block the tx during the cooldown period.

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I was going to suggest implementing a module that would allow delegating day to day transactions to other signers, but this solution also seems valid.

Thanks Gino for your kind attention.

1 Like
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[ADDENDUM] Establishing an Executive Arm to improve DAO Operations

This proposal is now in status: PASSED.

Voting Results:

  • Yes 96% 13,034,868 VP (48 votes)
  • No 1% 173,706 VP (5 votes)
  • Abstain 3% 497,656 VP (8 votes)
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23.27M MANA (-$6,128,911.54) have been transferred to the Council/Regenesis Lab multi-sig wallet.

This means that the new DAO OpCo has funds to start operating.

$125kUSDT were also sent before this transaction to advance funds quickly for salaries, given that the release of funds from the Aragon smart contract is not immediate.

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[ADDENDUM] Establishing an Executive Arm to improve DAO Operations

This proposal has been ENACTED by a DAO Committee Member (0xbef99f5f55cf7cdb3a70998c57061b7e1386a9b0)