[DAO:a005416] DAO Committee Deprecation & Replacement

[dao]

by 0x8dd060ad7f867ad890490fd87657c1b7e63c622f (Jungle)

Linked Draft Proposal

DAO Committee Deprecation & Replacement

Summary

We propose to deprecate the DAO Committee and migrate its execution-only duties to a lean 3-of-5 operational multisig that reflects ecosystem representation. This change preserves the Council’s approve/oversee role and enforces fund-scoped execution

Abstract

The DAO Committee historically acted as an operational and governance-enactment body: executing transactions, paying grants, and coordinating treasury operations. With the discontinuation of the grants program and the creation of the DAO Council, the Committee’s scope has significantly diminished.

This proposal introduces a transition strategy that retires the DAO Committee in its current form while reassigning execution responsibilities to a hybrid multisig structure composed of trusted representatives from existing entities within the Decentraland ecosystem.

Important note: After multiple attempts to secure the continuity of one Committee member in the multisig without receiving a response, the DAO Council has initiated conversations with external security providers that offer professional signer services. In parallel, the Council will also evaluate other candidates from the community or the Decentraland ecosystem who are considered suitable for the role.

The proposed multisig will consist of trusted representatives from the DAO Council, the Security Advisory Board (SAB), the Decentraland Foundation, and a security specialist or technically capable representative from the Decentraland ecosystem, forming a balanced and technically competent 3-of-5 multisig structure.

Motivation

The DAO Committee was once central to Decentraland’s operations: managing grants, paying contributors, executing transactions, and acting as a safeguard to ensure community-approved proposals were responsibly enacted. However, this role has fundamentally changed.

• Reduced Scope: With no grants program and significantly fewer operational transactions, the workload and responsibility no longer justify the current structure or its $2.4k USD in MANA/month compensation per member (3 members → $7.2k a month).
• Legacy Role: The Committee historically coordinated treasury-related execution to enact community-approved decisions. Going forward, the Council sets mandates and provides oversight; execution remains with the operational multisig as defined in this proposal.

DAO Committee current Ops

Polygon Multisig: https://polygonscan.com/address/0xb08e3e7cc815213304d884c88ca476ebc50eaab2

• Kyllian: 0x521B0fEf9CDCf250aBaF8e7BC798CBE13fa98692

• Tobik: 0x0E7C2D47D79D4026472F4f942c4947937dAa94a8

• Rizk: 0x2D83fFF2D4cE9F629bd636efCCff1662eb206fC4

Ethereum Multisig: https://etherscan.io/address/0x89214c8ca9a49e60a3bfa8e00544f384c93719b1

• Kyllian: 0xBef99f5f55CF7cDb3a70998C57061B7e1386a9b0

• Rizk: 0xfb1AFA4DC069ffb47b19dBeE196045D508fcD5A2

• Tobik: 0x88013D7eD946dD8292268a6FF69165a97A89a639

DAO Committee responsibilities since the suspension of the Grants Program are:

• Recurring payments (monthly):

  • Council members’ salaries
  • DAO Committee members’ salaries
  • Wearable and Emote curator fees

• Operational tasks (as needed):

  • Refilling the Polygon Gas Tank for meta transactions (rarely)
  • Granting LAND permissions from the DAO’s LAND pool (rarely)
  • Refunding Immunify bounties (rarely)

Over the past year, the Polygon Multisig has only sent MANA tokens to the Council or Committee members (compensations). No other outbound token transfers have been made: https://polygonscan.com/advanced-filter?fadd=0xb08e3e7cc815213304d884c88ca476ebc50eaab2&p=1

Since the grants stopped, the Ethereum Multisig has only sent payments to Wearable/Emote Curators, and made one Immunify Refund.

Moving Forward

The DAO’s evolution now requires a leaner, more transparent mechanism. Transitioning to a council-driven multisig mitigates these risks while ensuring operational continuity.

The new multisig model offers clear benefits:

• Representation: Aligns execution with representatives from major stakeholder entities across the project.
• Accountability: Authority is distributed, reducing risks of over-concentration.
• Cost Alignment: Updates compensation to reflect the reduced scope and new responsibilities.

Specification

1. Deprecation of the DAO Committee

   • Disband the Committee as an operational and decision-making body.
   • Transition its functions to the newly appointed multisig structure, while retaining the existing operational multisigs on both Ethereum and Polygon to ensure continuity.

2. Multisig Configuration

   • Structure: The multisig will operate as 3-of-5, retaining the existing operational multisigs on Ethereum and Polygon for continuity.
   • Designation: Signers will be appointed at the DAO Council’s discretion, following standard security practices, and may be rotated or replaced by the Council to maintain security and liveness.
   • Geographic Distribution Requirement: To strengthen resilience and reduce correlated risks, The DAO Council will take geographic diversity into account when appointing and rotating signers, with the aim of ensuring distribution across multiple regions and time zones.
   • Members will be designated as follows:
     • 2 current DAO Council members
     • 1 appointed SAB member
     • 1 appointed Foundation representative
     • 1 security specialist or technically capable representative from the Decentraland ecosystem

3. Responsibilities:

   • Execute all on-chain transactions required to enact:
     (a) passed governance proposals, and
     (b) Council-approved mandates (treasury management strategies, operational budgets, etc)
   • No policy-making power. The operational multisig does not approve plans or re-interpret mandates.

4. Signer Replacement Procedure

   • In the event of resignation or removal, the DAO Council will appoint replacements through an internal vote.

5. Compensation

   • Multisig signer responsibilities can be divided into two categories:
     • Passive tasks: Infrequent actions such as authorizing transfers replenishing the operating wallets. These are on-demand responsibilities and do not require continuous involvement. For these roles, compensation will be limited to reimbursing any transaction fees incurred.
     • Active tasks: Ongoing operational actions such as executing monthly compensations and handling smaller recurring payments or operations. These require consistent engagement. The Council will appoint an “operator” for the operating wallet, leveraging Safe’s native allowance feature. This role will have a predefined allowance limit for operational needs and will receive specific compensation to reflect its more active responsibilities.
   • This structure balances fairness, ensures costs are covered, and recognizes the difference between occasional signers and those taking on day-to-day operational duties.

Impacts

• Operational Agility: Faster execution DAO mandated proposals and treasury transactions, reducing unnecessary delays and bottlenecks.
• Balanced Authority: Distributes trust into trusted members across the DAO Council, SAB, Foundation, and a security specialist or technically capable representative from the Decentraland ecosystem, avoiding over-concentration.
• Cost Alignment: Adjusts compensation to reflect reduced responsibilities, ensuring sustainability.

Implementation Pathways

Until completion of the handover, the current DAO Committee remains the executor of transactions from the DAO Treasury, under Council mandates. Upon completion, the new operational multisig assumes that execution role as specified.

1. DAO Committee Offboarding

• Add the new set of signers to both multisigs.

• Remove old members from both multisigs.

• Discontinue DAO Committee compensation.

3. Multisig Configuration

• Implement designated representatives into the new 3-of-5 multisig.

• Update documentation and signer records.

• Assign operator’s ‘allowance’ (using the native allowance feature of the Safe), and appoint them to perform the monthly operations

3. Public Announcement

• Publish the new structure, disclose signer addresses, and responsibilities on the DAO governance forum and official channels.

Conclusion

This proposal addresses the diminished role of the DAO Committee by introducing a leaner and more transparent operational framework. By transitioning execution-only duties to a balanced 3-of-5 multisig composed of trusted representatives from across the ecosystem, the DAO ensures continuity while reducing unnecessary overhead. This change safeguards accountability, aligns costs with the actual scope of work, and distributes authority across key stakeholders. Ultimately, it strengthens Decentraland’s governance infrastructure, making operations more agile, resilient, and sustainable for the long term.

Vote on this proposal on the Decentraland DAO

View this proposal on Snapshot

[HPrivakos]

@dao

Important note: After multiple attempts to secure the continuity of one Committee member in the multisig without receiving a response

I personally was never contacted about this
Those multiple attempts were likely like the vast research for a Executive Director, absolutely inexistant.

Assign operator’s ‘allowance’ (using the native allowance feature of the Safe), and appoint them to perform the monthly operations

Already planning to suck off more of the treasury, congrats.

[Monotributista]

Hey @HPrivakos, the idea is to setup the allowance feature to cap the amount of funds that can be accessed from the multisig, to an amount that covers the monthly operations (paying the curator fees and the council members salary). It’s access to the multisig btw, not the treasury, that’s on a separate contract (the Aragon Agent).

Speaking of which, the current status of the Aragon Agent is that there are three people (who are not the dao committee, none was voted or was disclosed publicly) who have full access of the $17M treasury with a 24 timelock… the SAB can block the withdrawal, yes. But you are part of those 3 signers AND also part of the SAB… rings a bell of Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

Anyway, seriously, we are here just trying to have a learner but tighter setup. Any feedback is welcome.

[HPrivakos]

@Monotributista

there are three people (who are not the dao committee, none was voted or was disclosed publicly)

Yemel, mendez and I.
mendez was added as trusted member when Eric left, Yemel was never removed.
Me being in the SAB and DAO Committee doesn’t prevent other SAB or Committee members from cancelling a transaction, this doesn’t require a vote, just a single signature.
Yemel and Mendez were voted in here and here. (voted on by Esteban and on aragon, but being voted by a single person doesn’t change much compared to here )

[Monotributista]

I know, all that, just pointing out that the current setup is far from ideal. I think we can do better.

[Monotributista]

In any case, the Aragon Agent setup is not what’s being discussed in this proposal, so that’s for another discussion. I was just mentioning the irony of getting outraged by an allowance in an operational multisig, which is capped, while being OK with the current treasury setup, which has multiple people with unilateral uncapped access under a timelock.

If you have any suggestions for the operational multisigs setup, which is under the scope of this proposal, lets talk about it.

[AaronLeupp]

repost: This a YES from me and we all know why. It has been 18 MONTHS and two Proposals that was voted Yes on by the community and passed have STILL NOT BEEN ENACTED by DAO Commitee.

Been trying to bring all the top NFT collections communities (Crpto Punks) (Bored Ape Yacht Club) etc to Decentraland for 3+ Years and did the impossible and got written permission which was requested by @yemel and I did. And all 30,000+ 3D GLB molds have been made dozens of times until approval to work in Decentraland and now do. But Foundation and all other committee hands are tied because DAO Committee wont enact the contracts. STILL.

I honestly dont care they all get paid the $9,000 a month or whatever and if they do, good for them lol. This is just my main issue they are forcing me to care about. Them choosing to not enact contracts even when the community voted Yes to do it. I have to ask then, what is the point?? Isn’t this like by definition abuse of power? This may not pass and they will continue to keep this goin then, it is what it is and was worth the shot. I owe it to our teams hard work all these years to try and vote. But If this does end this committee then I wish them well and hope they continue to find success in whatever they do since they are talented people. But this has been our biggest hurdle for over a year now and I can see this being the only solution to get us through this 3 Year + long journey.

Add The Armory Club Alliance (working title) attempt 3 to the Linked...

Add Decentraland Dinos (working name) attempt 3# to the Linked Wearables...

[rizk]

For those couple idiots voting YES on this proposal (besides the Council and their foundation friends): you’re basically handing the entire DAO treasury to a couple of clowns in the Council.

1. They can sell +60 million MANA anytime they feel like it, without any proposals.

2. They’ll control +120 million MANA coming from the vesting contract over the next 5 years.

3. They can revoke the vesting and get the whole +120 million mana instantly whenever they want.

4. They can pay themselves whatever they want (we already see this with Regenesis Lab , hiring whoever they want, paying whatever they want, with zero audit).

5. They can fund any project they feel like, with no transparency, no accountability, and no oversight — exactly like now, where nobody really knows where the money goes.

6. In total, they’ll control 180+ million MANA, free to spend however they want.

You can’t hand over the money to a couple of people and give those same people unchecked decision-making power. That’s pure stupidity. its not a DAO anymore, it’ll just be a clown show run by the Council and their friends and its name should be changed.

[rizk]

@PunkPink as someone did this failure (800 add-ons) for 24k dollars, and zero people minted it , I wouldn’t expect you to understand the consequences of any of the above, so no worries.

@Monotributista

If you have any suggestions for the operational multisigs setup, which is under the scope of this proposal, lets talk about it.

It’s foolish to say that on the last governance proposal, where everything should already be clear and direct.

@dao

replacements through an internal vote.

Yes, as with all the decisions that have been made internally and hidden since the establishment of the Council .

[Monotributista]

Rizk, you seem to be very out of the loop of how things work:

1. No, this proposal changes the owners of the Ethereum Multisig and the Polygon Multisig, which hold less than 2M MANA tokens.

2. No, the Treasury is held by the Aragon Agent, who is also the beneficiary of the Vesting. The Aragon Agent can be commanded by the SAB only, and there are three people (HP, CEO and former-CTO) who can do withdrawals, with no cap limit, and a 24 hours timelock. This setup has been like this for a long time, and is not changed by this proposal (although I think we SHOULD revisit it soon, because the three signers with unlimited withdrawals is a huge risk).

3. LOL WHAT NOW? No. Only the SAB can command the agent to revoke or change ownership of the vesting contract. The Ethereum or Polygon multisigs are not connected to the Vesting or the agent in any way.
   Edit: I just checked and the owner of the Vesting contract has self-destructed, so neither the SAB, nor Esteban, not even Vitalik himself can revoke that vesting now.

4. There was a proposal for the compensation of the Council members set at $1k/m. Changing that would require another proposal. The Council members salary come from the Polygon multsig. We propose this multisig to have 5 members, only 2 council members. And the designated operator will have an allowance that limits how much access they have to the funds in that multisig. So “they can pay themselves whatever they want” would need collusion between Council, SAB, Foundation and the 5th signer, which at this point I guess neither you, Tobik or HP will volunteer for. Or if the operator went rogue, it wouldn’t have access to the ~$500k in that multisig because of the allowance cap. OTOH, the current setup is DAO committee pays themselves, using a multisig only they control, and they don’t need to collude with third parties in order to access the $500k in that multisig (let alone the $2.5M in the Ethereum one). I ask you, in the current setup, what stops the DAO Committee from “paying themselves whatever they want” besides “trust me bro”?

5. Are we reading the same proposal? The only payments that the Ethereum and Polygon multisigs will be doing, which are the ones we are talking about modifying in this proposal, are the following:

   • Paying for Curator fees (last month about $500),
   • Paying Council members comp (last month $4000)
   • Paying DAO Committee members compensation until deprecation (last month $7200)
   • Refill metatxs gas tank (rarely, I couldn’t find a tx in the last year)
   • Refund Immunify bug bounties, as they are paid by Foundation, and refunded from the DAO (in the last year there was only one ~$19k refund)

6. No, in total the Ethereum + Polygon multisigs hold about $3M in assets at todays prices, which you can check by visiting the links.

And to be honest that last point sparks some questions that now I would like to ask you, since we are talking:

You were very concerned about the ~$1M transfer (in two txs: one and two) that was done from the Regensis/Council Multisig (which was funded by the Executive Arm proposal) to Renegesis Operational Multisig who holds their budget for their 18 month operation. For that they proposed a budget, made a projection, was approved and so far they are sticking to it as far as I can tell by checking their operations on DeBank, since they are public. I’m not arguing that the transparency can still be improved, through reporting and also third party audits, but it’s a start.

Part of the concern was the amount being “too high” compared to expenses or that it was too many months in advance, and that the multisig was not properly setup (it had one owner). Both valid concerns, but so far the expenses seem to be around $70-$80k a month, which matches the budget and projections so far. I’ve only seen you paste screenshots of pieces of etherscan transactions and demanding what are they for, not even actual links, and that’s not how reporting or requesting information works. The other concern which I think is very valid, was that the multisig (not a “private wallet”, whatever that means) was not properly setup, since it had only 1 signer. This has been addressed since.

Now, lets review the actual status of the DAO Committee:

1. It currently holds $3M in assets (Ethereum + Polygon), and since the grants programs stopped, the expenses are around $12k a month, so that’s years of operational costs in the multisigs.

2. Largely those assets come from the Treasury (like this or that, which you know because you executed them), they were converted from MANA to ETH using CoWSwap, but they were never sent back to the Treasury? .

3. Before CoWSwap, the DAO Committee used to swap MANA to stables by sending it to their personal wallets and swapping it on 1inch, and no one ever raised concerns about those ‘private wallets’.

So in the end these things make me question your good faith, it seems like you have double standards when it comes to taking accountability. Adding on top of that, in the last few weeks since I joined I saw you weaponize the DAO discord and the TownHall to spread your propaganda, create an ‘us vs them’ narrative, then when people actually show up to answer questions, you don’t upload the video and argue that ‘nobody missed anything’ since it didn’t fit your agenda. I don’t blame you guys for the current state of things, which can be improved a lot, but I do for not wanting to change them. We can do better.

And this proposal does not address the Aragon Agent issues, but expect one coming soon to start thinking about that (super legacy, probably you can count with your fingers how many people understand how it’s set up, it’s also a set of +10 contracts to achieve the same as a regular Safe could do for the SAB. It has 3 outdated signers with unlimited access to the Treasury if the SAB sleeps for one day, and I could keep going). So if you are really concerned about the DAO and the current risks, I would love to keep the conversation going then, since it seems like all your concerns have nothing to do with this proposal.

EDIT: formatting.

[dao]

DAO Committee Deprecation & Replacement

This proposal is now in status: PASSED.

Voting Results:

• Yes 89% 11,702,508 VP (50 votes)
• No 10% 1,329,866 VP (5 votes)
• Abstain 1% 11,194 VP (3 votes)