by 0xd4f1cab694c4424c4796549edbb9b489789f4df5 (TudaMoon)
Removing Voting Power from MANA will give the Land Owners and DCL Name Owners more control over the DAO. Besides MANA has only a little impact from the voting power it gives to its users. This is implied from the words of Esteban. External Image
According to Esteban, “the marketplace fee and activity has a much larger effect on MANA price.” Therefore according to him, there will only be a minor effect on any de-pegging of MANA from VP. We should be focusing our efforts on marketplace fees and activity, NOT on the utility of MANA. External Image
When discussing with Esteban in December of 2022, he didn’t see the point in having the prices of the things priced in MANA, he much preferred it priced in the US Fiat Dollar. You can see that here.
This proposal would remove all associated Voting Power from MANA if passed.
Therefore 1 MANA = Zero Voting Power.
Esteban should support this easily as it gives more power to the people who have truly invested in the Land and Worlds which he has been promoting. We still need those creators he was talking about in 2022. Everyone Keep Voting the Way you have been, Clearly it’s been super effective. I am the insane one to vote differently and expect different results.
Transgresing but Interesting proposal, I always argued that Land owners and creators should have more VP/influence than MANA speculators or at least to the same level, it would also avoid exchanges like Binance to manipulate any future DAO decission, as its address only holds the ERC20 token.
A big caveat can be the districts and some controversy related to their VP (I don’t have a position in favour or against on that topic).
VP CEILING should be 20,000 no more allowing Jerome Powell to print money, send it to his nephew to take control of DCL. We should not emulate the oligarchs of communism USA in the virtual world nor give them this attack vector of control. If we want to see a world of zero opportunity we just get out of our computer chairs and go outside. We can’t beat fiat with emulation, but with innovation.
Encouraging Ecosystem Participation: By depegging VP from mana, users are encouraged to actively participate in the Decentraland ecosystem. This could involve buying and trading virtual items, names, or parcels of land.
Fairer Distribution of Voting Power: The current system may disproportionately favor large mana holders who might not be actively involved in Decentraland. Depegging VP from mana helps distribute voting power based on contributions and engagement within the platform rather than the sheer amount of mana held.
Community Engagement: Tying VP to the acquisition of virtual items, names, or land incentivizes users to contribute to the growth and development of Decentraland. This fosters a more engaged and active community, as voting power becomes a reflection of a user’s commitment and involvement.
Marketplace Stimulus: Introducing incentives for users to buy and trade items or land using mana can stimulate the Decentraland marketplace. This not only benefits individual users but also contributes to the overall economic activity within the platform.
Reducing Centralization Risks: Relying solely on mana for voting power might lead to centralization if a few large holders control a significant portion of the supply. Depegging VP from mana and tying it to active participation helps mitigate centralization risks, promoting a more decentralized decision-making process.
Alignment with Platform Goals: If Decentraland aims to be a vibrant and active virtual world, tying voting power to active contributions aligns with the platform’s goals. It ensures that decision-making authority is held by those who actively contribute to the platform’s growth.
I firmly believe that removing voting rights from MANA is an impractical idea; it’s simply not a feasible scenario because both are crucial assets within DCL. However, I also see it as an excellent proposal or discussion topic that, if handled properly, has the potential to fundamentally change the Decentraland (DCL) ecosystem. Here are a few points I’d like to share:
Firstly, I firmly believe that the voting rights of MANA should align with those of LAND. This is the fairest approach, as if investors realize they have little say in the decision-making process, they may question why they should invest in LAND. Establishing this correspondence can incentivize investor participation.
Secondly, while many are hopeful about the future, DCL’s history clearly demonstrates that its success heavily relied on the initial hype around LAND, injecting significant liquidity into the ecosystem. This historical lesson underscores the importance of early market activities for ecosystem success.
Finally, regarding market share, the founding team is well aware that the largest market share comes from where —I’ll just use the letter “C” to represent it . Land as one of the most critical assets in DCL, the value of LAND largely depends on its liquidity. However, early investor confidence in DCL has waned, primarily because they’ve discovered that when investing in district, almost all district leaders have, through various means, deceived them and taken away the parcels they invested in. This loss of confidence directly impacts the liquidity of LAND.
If we don’t address the issues and restore confidence among LAND investors in a timely manner, DCL is highly likely to lose the largest global market.
These are my current three viewpoints. If anyone is interested in delving deeper into the history of DCL, I’m more than willing to engage in further discussions with peers.
**Team work makes the dream work **