by 0x247e0896706bb09245549e476257a0a1129db418 (StrategicUnit)
SUMMARY
This proposal seeks the Community Feedback on the MANA weight of each plot of LAND when participating in the DAO voting.
DESCRIPTION
The Decentraland DAO is the decision-making tool for MANA, NAMES and LAND holders in Decentraland’s virtual world. Through votes in the DAO, the Community can have a say in important aspects of the virtual world, including grants, POIs, Names, policies, catalyst nodes, LAND and Estate smart contracts, and any other issues the Community deems relevant.
A vote on similar topics took place in 2019 and 2020. It would be insightful to understand the DAO’s thoughts in 2023.
This is a non-binding Pre-Proposal Poll created to gauge Community sentiment.
DETAILS
The current ratio for LAND-to-MANA when participating in the DAO voting is 1 LAND = 2000 MANA. The following are potential options for the new ratio:
1 LAND = 1000 MANA
1 LAND = 3000 MANA
1 LAND = 4000 MANA
If you have other ideas please leave your opinion in the comments.
I think we should increase the VP for owning land. This may also potentially incentivize individuals who only have builds deploy to worlds, to potentially crossover and purchase land. But I am curious to hear insight from other community members as well.
The original proposal to give vp weight to land was only voted on by 75 unique wallets.
The original outcome was as follows:
One LAND should equal 2k MANA: 15 votes
One LAND should equal 5k MANA: 5 votes
One LAND should equal 10k MANA: 32 votes
One LAND should equal more than 10k MANA: 23 votes
So while 10K, and 10K+ received more popular votes, 2K won because those 15 votes had the majority of VP. (Obviously multiple wallets for same users would mean that less than 75 individuals actually voted on this, and could have double-voted). Voting to give land holders less VP could be useful if a large holder held mana instead of VP. It would have preserved the status quo to not assign more VP to land than this, thus granting users hodling mana more power than those holding land.
Since Mana is a coin that can be bought and sold immediately on an exchange, it is much less risky than owning digital land, who needs to have a buyer in order to exit. Being rewarded for taking the extra risk of hodling land instead of mana might be of value. Just food for thought
Very good analysis and assessment Canessa! LAND holders are the higher risk takers here and to incentivize people for buying LAND, the VP needs to increase as well. Right now, one reason I personally not buying more LAND is because of the deduction in VP I will have. For example, i spent 20K MANA on a 5 LAND ESTATE and with the current VP of 1 LAND = 2K MANA, my VP dropped by 10K. I agree with you that holding MANA is a less riskier investment than holding LAND thus, i support this proposal to further incentivize the higher risk takers in the DCL ecosystem.
Absolutely agree , I believe this is not solely about VP; it’s also related to land prices. We’ve tried various approaches to bring the land price back to 4,000+ MANA, but there has been no change thus far. This is primarily due to the VP being set at 2,000 MANA, which the market provides a strong support level for the bottom land price stay at 2000mana. If we increase the VP , the land price would likely follow suit and increase as well.
Interesting… this is probably one of the most dangerous proposals I have seen in the DAO so far, it could possibly double a certain actively voting districts VP. Giving them around 8 million VP. Many proposals are already decided by 1 districts vote, this would guarantee that pretty much every proposals outcome will be decided by it. I am not claiming anything about that district by pointing out this fact about the risks of this proposal.
Even ignoring this point, decentralands most promising way to scale to mass adoption is through worlds. This proposal has the chance of giving every decision outcome of the DAO to land holders, which would mean that the chance of passing proposals that benefit world’s development (decentralands most promising way to scale) will be extremely small.
Why do we want to centralize more voting power to land holders? Will land holders always vote for the benefit of the platform or for the benefit of their land holdings?
I am bringing up these things that voters should consider before making a decision on this. Disclaimer, I own land in decentraland, but still think it’s an extremely bad idea to give more VP to owning land.
The floor for Lands is currently 2.2k MANA, while would you want to increase its VP value? Most of the VPs is already from lands, that will only accentuate the VP disparity between community members (saying that while 50% of my VP is from lands…)
We have to calculate not only robs voting power here if his gets doubled that would mean seanny’s vp would get doubled aswell who still would be able to counter vote alongsinde with hp and dg.
If you need to adjust everything, then why change this to start with?..
It will be worse for everyone (except RobL and LandlordDAO) if this proposal passes.
I think we should start with names VP first and increase that. Names will have less probability of selling in most cases as many buy their name for a personal reason. Yes some are brand names or what’s popular at the time but doesn’t mean someone is going to purchase it. I would rather buy my own original name than a used one and rather buy land than a used name as well considering the price for some of them. Plus this will allow those who cannot afford land a bit more say in voting.
1Name = 100 VP - current
1Name = 250 VP ?
1Name = 500 VP?
1 4 letter name = X VP?
1 5 letter name = x VP?
1 6 letter name = X VP?
was just another thought. I know on ENS the letter count has a value attached to thos with fewer letters used. Not really the same in DCL but was a thought.
Why would it be worse for everyone? VP pushes the land price to 4,000 MANA, which means people would need to purchase more MANA for buying lands. As the MANA price increases, DAO funds also rise. This sets up a significant circulation within the entire Decentraland ecosystem. We are fine with it; LandlordDAO won’t participate in this poll vote, but we wanted to share our thoughts!
Actually, there is at least more than few district in Decentraland with more than 8 million VPs, but they haven’t participated in the voting. If the whale districts decide to vote, their votes will dominate regardless of whether it’s increased or not. This is the reality. To address this issue, I would like to suggest that all district votes should be conducted through their respective contributors first.
I will be closely monitoring the outcome of this poll proposal. If it passes in favor of increase, I have two proposals written & ready to go for Names & L1’s
Personally speaking I am more vested in MANA, names and L1 wearables.
As a multi district leader I represent multiple large voting blocks (each of which has a different policy of governance as voted on by contributors).
As a hands on builder myself and lead of a production studio, I am really biased towards upholding the value of LAND as I think that is what makes the open world of Genesis City “special” and a market leader and different to what has become a plethora of “Worlds” type compartmentalised metaverses.
With those biases stated, I would personally not vote in this proposal for the above reasons. But I would like to state my opinion/position being someone with considerable “skin in the game”.
The “fair” solution as I would see it, would be to have a policy which aims to uphold the alignment between LAND and MANA VP. If the floor of LAND is 2200 MANA then a 2K VP for LAND feels fair. If we see LAND shift up so that it is closer to a 3000 MANA floor, then I think there should be a mechanism to uplift the VP of LAND to 3K. And if LAND drops to 1000 MANA, then we should see VP drop to 1K VP per LAND.
Really, that feels like it would be a pretty uncontentious policy that both respects LAND and MANA holders without any bias in either direction.
Firstly, this proposal aims to magnify the voting influence of all land and district owners rather than focusing solely on one individual. Secondly, the underlying concern appears to originate from apprehensions about a potential malevolent participant. However, it’s worth noting that the root of the problem seems to lie in the lack of active engagement by other district owners. It’s also important to highlight that Esteban has distributed a substantial VP, to 26 individuals, totaling a significant VP value of 13 million. This VP allocation could potentially be employed to counterbalance the voting impact of the aforementioned individual (should the individual VP rise to 8M in your scenario).
An illustrative instance of robust engagement occurred during the recent proposal to ban a specific individual, led by RobL, which garnered widespread participation from district owners, effectively overshadowing RobL’s considerable VP share.
This augmentation or doubling of VP, extended to other district owners, has the potential to further counter RobL’s voting influence, despite the fact that RobL might receive additional VP through the present proposal. Thus, the core issue here does not pertain to augmenting VP for landholders per se, but rather pertains to the lack of active participation by other district owners.
Regarding your question: “Why do we want to centralize more voting power to land holders?” Is it not evident that there is an ongoing concentration of voting power among individuals presently entrusted with Esteban’s delegated VP? Moreover, a more concerning scenario is emerging where individuals with lower levels of risk exposure are being granted greater influence to dictate the results of proposals.
From my perspective, a notion that is markedly inadvisable revolves around the hesitation to provide greater VP to landholders, who, in my opinion, have assumed considerably higher risks compared to MANA holders. Instead, the primary concern seems to be centered on individuals holding VP, particularly those who have been delegated by Esteban, leveraging their voting power to favor proposals that serve personal interests or those of acquaintances, partners, or affiliates, rather than advancing the collective interests of Decentraland.
