I’m voting YES on this proposal because it tackles key operational inefficiencies and governance challenges within the DAO.
On Rebuilding the Voting Power System:
The issue isn’t the VP system itself but what we ask VP holders to vote on. VP represents stakeholders with “skin in the game,” ensuring those invested in the platform help safeguard its future. Anyone can acquire VP by holding tradable assets, maintaining decentralization.
We should focus VP holders’ votes on impactful topics, not burden them with minor decisions. This proposal suggests delegating resource allocation to a dedicated team that can execute strategies autonomously. This approach keeps significant decisions in the hands of VP holders while allowing day-to-day operations to be managed by an accountable team.
VP holders won’t vote to change the governance mechanism without a solid proposal that offers clear benefits to the project. I haven’t seen such a proposal yet.
I support exploring XP (experience power) to represent active users and creators in Decentraland (instead of stakeholders). XP could give users influence over product prioritization and content curation like POIs, NAMEs, and Places. However, we can’t yet include XP in governance due to risks like hacks, bots, and manipulation. This concept needs thorough testing before it can be considered for governance.
On Centralization Concerns:
Decentralization exists at various levels in Decentraland. Assets granting VP are decentralized and secured by smart contracts. The content layer is distributed across a network of servers. The SDK is an open standard that allows the implementation of the explorer in different game engines. All the code is open-source, enabling external contributions and providing the opportunity to reboot Decentraland if something happens to the main instance.
However, not all areas should be decentralized. Strategic decision-making and efficient capital allocation require delegation and accountability. Public voting alone isn’t enough because these decisions need deep context from decision-makers, active participation in negotiations, oversight, evaluation, and integration into a broader strategy. Centralizing this process under accountable leadership ensures better use of the DAO’s resources.
This proposal seeks to centralize the allocation of capital and strategy-making, but the governance process still belongs to VP holders. There are limits to what this organization can do, ensuring that VP holders retain control over significant decisions. Without centralizing these aspects, we risk inaction or misallocation of funds on projects with little impact.
On Accountability:
Accountability has been lacking in the DAO’s current structure. This proposal aims to address that by making a single individual responsible for operational efficiency. This person will be accountable for success or failure and can be removed if they don’t meet expectations. They will also have the authority to manage team members effectively.
Selection and oversight of this individual should be handled by representatives with deep knowledge of the DAO’s operations. VP holders should retain the ability to remove council members as a safeguard. I also support term limits for council members to bring in fresh perspectives.
The operational team should engage regularly with the stakeholders and users alike. Transparency and open communication are crucial.
On DAO’s Discord Toxicity:
Discord has become a pain point due to toxicity, hindering meaningful discussions and effective governance. Possible solutions include closing the DAO’s Discord channel and moving discussions to the forum for more structured exchanges, delegating Discord moderation to the operational team for consistent management, or merging DAO discussions with the Foundation’s Discord under clearer moderation guidelines. The goal is to foster a healthier environment for debate.
Why Not Transfer Part of the Treasury to the Foundation?
Transferring the DAO’s treasury to the Foundation would miss a crucial opportunity. The DAO has a chance to evolve into an autonomous entity managing its own resources. By transferring funds, we’d give up the autonomy the DAO needs to cultivate.
This proposal allows the DAO to hire an Executive Director who is accountable for operational decisions and ensures transparency. It enables the DAO to fund projects the Foundation may not prioritize, like alternative clients for Decentraland.
Consolidating everything under the Foundation contradicts the principle that it shouldn’t handle all aspects of the platform. The Foundation should focus on client development, while the DAO invests in creating a vibrant ecosystem of creators and exploring technical innovation outside of the Foundation’s roadmap.
Conclusion:
By voting YES, we move toward a more accountable and efficient DAO while maintaining decentralization where it matters. This restructuring is a necessary step for long-term success.
Thank you to everyone contributing to this vital discussion!