by 0x247e0896706bb09245549e476257a0a1129db418 (LordLike)
ABSTRACT
This proposal aims to introduce a new voting mechanism to address the issue of last-minute voting in the Decentraland DAO. The objective is to ensure more reflective and fair governance decisions.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
1. Randomized Proposal Voting End Time
Implement a randomized closure period toward the end of the established proposal’s voting timeframe. The exact closing moment of the DAO proposal will not be known to voters but will occur randomly within a predetermined percentage of the closing phase of the proposal voting period. This specific percentage and the parameters for randomness will be determined based on community feedback.
2. Extension of the Voting Period
Extend the standard proposal voting period if significant voting activity occurs in the final hours or minutes. This extension will be triggered if the vote margin changes by more than a predefined percentage (to be determined through community input) within the last 24 hours. This allows stakeholders more time to evaluate and react to late swings in voting outcomes.
VOTING OPTIONS
YES: Change Governance Mechanism.
NO: Leave as it is.
This is a non-binding pre-proposal poll to assess community sentiment. If approved, feedback and insights will be solicited to refine and finalize the points.
Example: Suppose the community agrees to implement a randomized closure within the last 20% of a 14-day voting period. This 20% translates to approximately 3 days. Therefore, the randomized closure could happen at any time during days 12 to 14 of the voting period. Voters would not know exactly when within this window the voting will close, encouraging them to cast their votes earlier rather than risking missing out if they wait until what they assume to be the last moment.
2. Extension of the Voting Period
Example: Imagine on the 14th day—the final scheduled day of voting—a surge in votes occurs, resulting in a total vote count that increases by more than the predefined trigger of 10%(for instance). To accommodate this significant last-minute participation and allow time for all stakeholders to respond, the voting period could extended by an additional day(or other period defined by DAO).
Answered yesterday on Discord, pasting here for the record
Even though the ideas are good, the ethos behind off-chain voting with on-chain reference is the concept of the snapshot (Concept that Snapshot, the tool we use for gasless voting takes advantage of). The idea behind Snapshot is that it takes a picture of the blockchain status at the momentof the proposal creation. By doing that, ensures that VP is not modified during the proposal duration. For that to happen, the voting period needs to be written at the proposal creation moment. Maybe there is something we could to to obfuscate the ending time in the Governance dApp and define that randomly at the moment of the creation using a logic voted by the community, but in Snapshot and elsewhere it will be visible, therefore, is not super effective.
In addition to the technical feasability, this goes against the movement other DAOs are doing to reduce voting fatigue by setting specific days of the week for proposals creation. See for example Arbitrum, and Optimism
