by 0x247e0896706bb09245549e476257a0a1129db418 (LordLike)
The absence of a period of duration for DAO committee members in Decentraland can lead to several potential issues, including:
Lack of accountability: Without a set term, committee members may not be held accountable for their actions, leading to potential abuses of power.
Lack of fresh perspectives: Without new members regularly joining the committee, the same individuals may hold power for an extended period of time, stifling innovation and new ideas.
Lack of trust: The absence of term limits may lead to concerns about the impartiality of the committee, as members may become entrenched in their positions and less responsive to the needs of the community.
Reduced democratic participation: The absence of term limits may discourage community members from participating in governance, as they may feel that their voices will not be heard.
It is important to balance the need for stability and consistency with the need for accountability, fresh perspectives, and democratic participation. A system with term limits and regular elections can help to address these potential issues.
There is a good example DAO can follow - Accountability Committee.
According to Article 5 of the Accountability Committee Framework:
“This Accountability Committee selected by the Decentraland DAO Community is expected to be in office for twelve (12) months and the members could be re-elected only for one consecutive period.”
Yes: Set duration period for DAO Committee members for 12 months and members re-election only for one consecutive period.
for the dao committee, i think there should be permanent members, but that doesn’t mean there couldn’t be rotating members as well.
HP and Yemel know as much about this platform as is possible and having one or both of them off the DAO committee for the sake of term limits would be (imo) disastrous - i don’t see anyone else with their level of knowledge to replace either of them.
that being said, the new group of people who are running for new positions could be seen as rotating members. However, for this position, which we’ve discussed quite a lot would be in an ideal situation 90% automated, i don’t really see the use as there’s not really an ideological basis, just a technical one
Thanks for the comment. Partially agree with you in terms of automation, but so far it is not clear when this will happen. My opinion is that the DCL cannot always rely only on certain people, this is fraught with stagnation and a lack of transparency and democratic principles.
As a solution, I see increased requirements for candidates(including technical) and a methodology that can be created to train future committee members.
Its pre-proposal poll to start moving in this direction, there are two more gov steps ahead.
Also, about new members, there is SAB which oversees DAO Committee members actions.
The Security Advisory Board acts as a guarantor of Decentraland’s smart contract security, and is tasked with overseeing the work of the DAO Committee and responding to vulnerability and bug reports in any of Decentraland’s contracts.
By the way, the final proposal may include a transition period for the implementation of this decision, for example, from 2024-2025.
So the members of the DAO committee will have the goal of creating a methodology and clear requirements for future candidates before the end of the transition period.
That wiki page is not actually correct.
The SAB safekeep the smartcontracts, including the Aragon one, which happens to holds some funds for the DAO. If that one had an issue, the SAB could intervene (like it did when Yemel’s key had to be rotated). But the role of the SAB is not to oversees the DAO Committee.
Correct, the multisigs requires at least 2 out of 3 members to sign, and Aragon require no cancellation within 24 hours to pass a transfer.
If I see a DAO Committee member (of if a DAO Committee member sees me) doing a wrong transaction on Aragon, they need to cancel it within 24 hours.
Changing the number of signatures and the number of members. For example multisig with 4 signatures of 5. (Solution for faster decision making due to different time zones of members can be scheduled time ahead for this.)
Also i agree with @szjanko that there should be no limit on consecutive period though duration period and elections can be held every 12 months. I think this edit can be done in Draft proposal if this poll passes.
I support this proposal as a starting point. However I think 12 months is too short of a term of service. Having served on boards for my church and SIGGRAPH I know there is a level of institutional knowledge that is built up by the people serving on committees. I recommend rather a 24 month or 36 month period of service where only 1 of the members of the committee will be replaced at a time.
With a staggered rotation there would always be a member with one and two years of experience on hand. Imagine the ramp up time if all three or five of the committee members were brand new in their position. How much business of the DAO grant administration would happen if every new member were being trained in?
I don’t see any of these problems with the DAO committee positions… Their only job is to enact our decisions on the chain… their tasks are simple, black and white and there’s no room for lack of accountability. Lack of fresh perspectives: anyone in the DAO has the opportunity to provide feedback, ideas, and create proposals, being on the DAO committee does not give any special privilege for sharing perspectives. We are receptive to HP and Yemel’s advice because of their level of expertise and experience, not their position. Lack of trust: it is not the job of the DAO Committee to be receptive to the needs of the community, their job is purely transactional and they are bound to perform on the proposals passed by the community, they don’t have a choice in this matter. Reduced participation: the DAO committee’s scope of work has nothing to do with this.
Good points. Many vasting models exist for organizations like bar associations wherein the outgoing keeps an advisory non-voting role. president or commissioner elect similiar approach.