[DAO:7744b2f] Limit Fund Appropriation to Grant Proposals

by 0x5b5cc427c1d81db4f94de4d51d85ce122d63e244 (Fehz)

Linked Draft Proposal

Limit Fund Appropriation to Grant Proposals

Summary

This proposal aims to restrict the appropriation of funds from the Decentraland DAO to the established Grants Framework.

Abstract

This proposal advocates for limiting fund appropriations from the Decentraland DAO to the established new Grants Framework approved on December 28, 2022. And it comes as a response to previous instances where funds were allocated through binding governance proposals, raising questions about the legitimacy of such actions. By implementing this measure, the DAO aims to ensure that all project and initiative funding adheres to the approved Grants Framework.

Motivation

The motivation behind this proposal stems from past events where the Decentraland DAO allocated $1 million USD in MANA to Decentral Games (ICE-USDC liquidity pool) to incentivize Daily Active Users (DAUs). This allocation was done through a Binding Governance Proposal as it did not fit within the existing Grants Framework’s parameters. While it was neither explicitly permitted nor prohibited under current DAO rules, it triggered crucial discussions.

Two key questions emerged from this incident:

  1. Is it appropriate to appropriate funds outside of the previously agreed Grants program framework, such as through binding governance proposals?
  2. Is the existing Grants Program framework adequately designed to accommodate all funding needs of the DCL community, especially for special projects with more flexible distribution models?

The DAO approved a new Grants Program framework with updated categories and requirements to address these concerns. This led to the creation of the “Grant Accelerator” category as a way to provide private companies or revenue-generating initiatives to request investments from the DAO.

Specification

The proposal’s main objective is to restrict the appropriation of funds from the Decentraland DAO to the established Grants Framework. This restriction explicitly prohibits the use of binding governance proposals as a means to receive money from the DAO treasury.

Outside this restriction is the compensation of the committee’s team members that have been established through binding Governance proposals (Such as the DAO Committee, Wearables Curation Committee, or Revocations Committee).

In all other cases, the Grants Framework serves as the sole mechanism for requesting and receiving DAO funding.

Impacts

  • Streamlined Funding Process: The proposal eliminates the use of binding governance proposals for fund allocation, which may have been less structured and consistent in comparison to the Grants Framework.

  • Mitigation of Loopholes: The proposal serves as a stop-gap measure to close potential loopholes in the governance and grant-making process. It prevents future instances of unauthorized appropriations of DAO funds for projects and initiatives outside the established Grants Framework.

Implementation Pathways

The approval of this proposal will prohibit the use of binding governance proposals as a means to receive money from the DAO treasury.

Conclusion

As the Decentraland DAO evolves, it must remain adaptable to changing circumstances while developing an agile and robust governance system. This proposal acts as a stop-gap measure to address potential loopholes in the governance and grant-making process. While long-term solutions are explored and implemented, this measure will ensure that all funding aligns with the approved Grants Program framework and prevent appropriations through binding governance proposals.

Vote on this proposal on the Decentraland DAO

View this proposal on Snapshot

This voting is coming just in time for a new loophole exploit by DG, that is about to request the DAO to swap ~$1M worth of MANA for DG tokens in exchange of “30% of all revenue generated in MANA from the Tominoya Casino would belong to the Decentraland DAO” (without explaining what “belonging” means).

The Decentraland DAO will initiate a token swap, converting 900,000 DAI worth of MANA for DG tokens through open market operations. This process will be implemented over a span of 15 days from the approval date of this proposal. The daily transaction amounts might vary, but the complete purchase is ensured by the end of the stipulated 15-day period. This strategy is designed to deter any potential front-running of the purchases. In addition, there will be a further 100,000 DAI worth of MANA swapped Over The Counter (OTC) for DG tokens. These MANA tokens will then be utilized by Decentral Games to back up the MANA bets.

https://snapshot.org/#/decentralgames.eth/proposal/0x5765081e1790a7239f008eeac95b0a1ac1e2893f200a780838d5a2546e293ec4

I actually that, based on the feedback, Gabe has removed that DG prop.

I also wonder if a prop can stop future props over ride it.

Perhaps it makes sense to propose a larger majority must vote yes, 66% or 75%, to change dao process, so something like this prop is harder to over rule or undo.

We’ve had this proposal escalation in our back pocket for a while. The decision back in the day was to leave the proposal in a Draft form unless its invocation was necessary, which apparently it did become necessary.

This could be a good way to solidify proposals that are passed as binding, and for something like a decentralized constitution, in that binding governance proposals are thus more difficult to override with subsequent legislation.

This would solve one potential issue, while at the same time creating a few others however, e.g. interpretation surrounding if a proposal directly overrides a previous proposal, who is responsible for that interpretation, etc. The other potential issue is a party getting a vote passed based on short term acquisition of MANA or some other manipulation, and then having it very difficult to override.

That said, I do like that idea of there being some voting/VP implication for overturning proposals that have been previously passed as a binding governance proposal.

I suppose you are still hurt about DG and the 1M in funding from the gov prop a while ago. A bit contradictory accusing others of “exploiting”.

How many grants has DG been approved for before? What has been their contributions to DCL as a whole?

How many grants has GolfCraft been approved for before? What has been their contributions to DCL as a whole? I can’t even see it on the explorer page anymore.

Limit Fund Appropriation to Grant Proposals

This proposal is now in status: PASSED.

Voting Results:

  • Yes 98% 11,259,683 VP (173 votes)
  • No 1% 3 VP (7 votes)
  • Abstain 1% 912 VP (4 votes)

Limit Fund Appropriation to Grant Proposals

This proposal has been ENACTED by a DAO Committee Member (0xbef99f5f55cf7cdb3a70998c57061b7e1386a9b0)