When you “delegate VP” to someone, you essentially “choose to vote the same” as this person.
Therefore if this person chooses to vote the same as yet another person, then you should also be choosing to vote the same as that other person.
As a consequence, when you delegate your VP, that should include the VP that has been delegated to you.
This is called Transitivity: A=>B and B=>C means A=>C.
If A votes like B, and B votes like C, then A votes like C.
This is how we can get chains like A=>D, A=>E, etc, and in the end, how to get VP in the hands of the trusted and qualified few, who will make the wisest decisions with it.
At any time, anyone in any chain can choose to take back the VP with which they have been entrusted, and delegate it to someone else.
I intend to create a visual simulation that would run in a DCL scene, that would show the network of VP Delegation which should result from this, so that people can study the various outcomes which can take place.
I will include ways of parametrizing the simulation, with options such as “lack of participation” and “chance/percentage of corruption”.
Thanks for sharing your thoughts on this TAO-like way.
I think you’re missing something that might be important for this reflection: Delegation in DCL is liquid, which means that I can delegate my VP, but if the person I chose to delegate my VP to does not vote as I would vote in a proposal, I can reclaim my VP back and vote on the same proposal, reducing the weight of my delegate vote. Transitive delegation would not allow for this as it would be hard to create relationships between the delegate nodes of the transitive chain.
Would you say that adding a mechanism for transitive VP is more critical than the concept of liquid representation/delegation?
The last sentence in the body of the initial post describes how this is simply not an issue:
Not only would Transitive Delegation allow for the possibility of reclaiming VP, it would allow anyone in the chain in-between to be able to reclaim this VP.
Neither of the original delegators would even having to worry about staying on top of developments within the DAO.
As a result, the dynamics would be even more liquid.
I want to take the time to clarify that this should not result in an overly liquid system, where final delegation recipients end up not having enough stability to be able to push through the Proposals that are for the good of Decentraland.
This is because there should be no reason for anyone having delegated VP to them to want to take it back, if there is indeed proof of capable and trustworthy leadership.
One should really be instead considering the incentive this will be creating: “be sure to keep pushing Proposals which the community considers good, else people will be reclaiming their VP en masse !”
